

# ***Does Border Enforcement Matter?***

## ***U.S. Immigration Control Policy from Clinton to Obama***


Presentation to the Silicon Valley Center for Global Innovation  
and Immigration, San José State University

Wayne Cornelius  
Co-Director, University of California Global Health Institute  
Associate Director, UC Center of Expertise on Migration and Health




*17 years after Operation "Hold-the-Line" (El Paso) began, what have we accomplished?*

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


# ***We have spent a lot of money:***

## Federal spending on immigration enforcement, in millions




***\$17.1 billion*** being spend on immigration enforcement this year, plus ***\$600 million*** in supplemental border security bill passed in July 2010



ICE = interior enforcement; CBP = border enforcement



# U.S. Border Patrol has more than quintupled in size since 1992



*Physical infrastructure for border enforcement has been vastly enhanced*

**Total miles of new fencing built , 2006-2010:**  
more than **600** miles, including pedestrian fencing  
+ vehicle barriers (= **31%** of southwest border)

**Construction cost for  
pedestrian fencing:**  
\$3.9 - \$16 million  
per mile



Triple-fenced  
section of U.S.-  
Mexico border  
near San Diego







*Newest sections of border fence are 20 ft. high*





## Our own Great Wall

*Border fence on  
Otay Mountain,  
near San Diego*

*Cost of construction:  
\$16 million per mile*




*Fence on Otay Mountain, San Diego County*




## Closing the door

To deter illegal entry, the U.S. Border Patrol is building a large earthen berm across a canyon near San Diego known as Smuggler's Gulch .



Sources: U.S. Border Patrol, Google Earth



BRADY MACDONALD Los Angeles Times

*Smuggler's Gulch fencing project near San Diego*





*Completed Smuggler's Gulch fencing project*





*Concertina wire  
has been added to 5  
miles of border fence  
between San Diego  
and Tijuana*











*Border fence “floats” on sand dunes, Imperial Dunes, Calif.*

*Remote video surveillance systems have been installed in all urbanized areas along the border*



# Mexican Migration Field Research and Training Program

*University of California, San Diego*



Tijuana

Ciudad Juárez

Guaymas/  
San Carlos

Chihuahua

Loreto

La Paz

Monterrey

Cabo San Lucas

Matamoros

Tlacuitapa, Jal.

Gulf of Mexico

Tunkas, Yuc.

Puerto Vallarta

Guadalajara

México City

Mérida

Playa del Carmen

Cozumel

Manzanillo

Ixtapa/  
Zihuatanejo

Cuerpo

San Miguel Tlacotepec, Oax.

Oaxaca

Huatulco

Acapulco



Migrant-sending towns  
studied every 3 years



Mexican research sites selected purposively to maximize variation on:

- Community tradition of migration to U.S.  
(1 - 2<sup>nd</sup>, 3<sup>rd</sup>, 4<sup>th</sup> generation)
- Level of social and economic development/marginality
- Ethnic composition (mestizo vs. indigenous)

U.S. research sites determined by principal destinations of migrants leaving Mexican research sites:

- California (San Diego, Orange County, Los Angeles, S.F. Bay Area)
- Oklahoma (Oklahoma City)



**4,884** survey interviews and **1,500+** hours of in-depth life history interviews conducted in communities of origin and destination, 2005-2010





MMFRP Field Research Team, Tlacuitapa, Jalisco, January 2010



# Pooled data set

*Four survey waves included:*

Jalisco + Calif. + Oklahoma 2007

Oaxaca + Calif. 2007


Yucatan + Calif. 2009

Jalisco + Calif. + Oklahoma 2010


*Sample characteristics:*

All adult residents of Mexican sending communities; snowball samples of U.S.-based migrants from same points of origin


*Total N = 1,935 for respondents with U.S. migration experience; 3,530 for experienced migrants + potential first-time migrants*



# Number of times apprehended on most recent trip to border (in percentages; N = 842)




Eventual success rate among migrants apprehended  
at least once, on same trip to border  
(in percentages; N= 753)






# Apprehension and eventual success rate among Jalisco migrants, by year of most recent entry attempt (percentages)



Percent




Apprehended on most recent trip to border



Able to enter eventually on same trip



# Border enforcement intensity vs. probability of apprehension among Mexican migrants



# ***Why is border enforcement so ineffective?***





## *No continuous physical barrier:*

Numerous gaps in border fencing, due to adverse topography, hydrology, Indian reservations, wildlife refuges, etc.








### Fencing Construction Status

Data current as of 05/29/2009







Yuma  
Sector

El Centro  
Sector

ARIZONA

San Diego  
Sector

Tucson  
Sector

Phoenix

San  
Diego

Calexico

Mexicali

Yuma

Tijuana

Tucson

Lukeville

Sonoyta

Sasabe

Nogales

Gulf of  
California





*The Maginot Line, France, 1940*

*Migrants detour around most heavily fortified segments of land border, crossing in more remote and dangerous areas*



*U.S.-Mexico border fortifications, 2010*



*Border fences can be climbed over*





*Fences will never be high enough*




## *Fences can be tunneled under by people-smugglers*



# Entered through a legal POE on most recent trip to U.S.


(percentages; N=827)





# Mode of entry through legal port of entry

(percentages; N=180)



Unauthorized entries are being made through legal ports of entry because they are more likely to succeed + reduce physical risk  
*(mean number of apprehensions on most recent trip to border)*

	Crossed through POE	Crossed away from POE
Pooled dataset (2007-10)	0.69	0.88
Yucatan migrants(2009)	0.36	0.73
Jalisco migrants (2010)	0.51	0.70



May 26, 2009

## **Migrant smugglers take to the seas**

ENCINITAS – Nearly two dozen illegal immigrants were detained early Tuesday near Swami's Beach, and two people believed to have smuggled them into the country were arrested shortly afterward on a boat, officials said.

***Migrants can also enter by sea***

**Maritime smuggling of migrants is up five-fold in San Diego County in the last 3 years**







## Popotla, Baja California

*Launching point for most maritime people-smuggling to San Diego County*




*What migrants know and believe about border enforcement doesn't stop them from trying*







# What undocumented migrants know about border enforcement measures in 2010, by most recent state of entry (percentages; N= 830)



**Border deterrence factors:** *“What do you worry about most, when thinking about going to the U.S. without papers?”* (Jalisco, 2010)




# Believes it is very difficult to evade Border Patrol, by most recent state of entry (percentages; N=834)






# Perceives clandestine entry as dangerous or very dangerous

(percentages; N=852)



# *Migrant fatalities have increased in tandem with tougher U.S. border enforcement*



\*Incomplete data, through September 21, 2010. Data sources: Maria Jimenez, *Humanitarian Crisis: Migrant Deaths at the U.S.- Mexico Border*, October 1, 2009, p.17; *Arizona Republic*, 9/22/10; Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores, Mexico.

## Record number of border-crossing fatalities (252) in Arizona in FY 2010



*Migrant's body being removed from Arizona desert, August 2010*



## Effects of border enforcement beliefs/perceptions on propensity to migrate: Logit results

- Only two of the measured border enforcement variables significantly influence propensity to migrate: (1) *knowing someone who died in a border-crossing attempt*; (2) *believing that it is “very dangerous” to enter clandestinely*.
- However, the deterrent effect of these border-crossing beliefs/perceptions is relatively weak, compared with gender, prior U.S. migration experience, and having more relatives in U.S. *Perceived danger* is barely significant in the final model.
- *Perceived difficulty of border crossing* and *knowledge of border enforcement measures* are not statistically significant predictors of propensity to migrate.
- Awareness of a border-crossing fatality is *positively* associated with intention to migrate, probably because such people know more people with migration experience (better information).


*Tighter border enforcement deters new migration mainly through its impact on people-smugglers' fees*



- Higher probability of apprehension and more dangerous crossings = greater demand for coyotes, and coyotes can charge more.
- However, the Great Recession has reduced demand for coyotes because U.S.-based relatives can no longer finance all or most of the cost.
- Result: a flattening of the run-up in coyote fees.

# Used coyote on most recent trip to U.S.


(in percentages; N=857)





# Used coyote on most recent trip to U.S.

(in percentages; N=854)




# Average coyote fee paid, by year of most recent trip

(medians; in 2010 U.S. dollars)




# Principal source of financing for unauthorized migration

(percentages; N=834)





*Migrants who hire coyotes stay longer in the U.S.,  
since they need more time to pay off coyote debt*



Source: CCIS survey of Yucateco migrants in U.S. and Yucatan, 2009.

*Border Patrol  
apprehensions have  
dropped sharply:*

FY 2000: 1,675,438

FY 2008: 723,825


FY 2009: 556,041

*(fewer migrants =  
fewer apprehensions)*

*New inflows of  
unauthorized Mexican  
immigrants have  
dropped sharply in  
last three years*

**Figure A1**

Average Annual Inflow of Unauthorized  
Immigrants from Mexico, by Period,  
2000-2009  
(thousands)



Notes: Flows are derived as differences of population totals over given intervals, classified by period of arrival in U.S., from March CPS supplements. Averages of alternative estimates are shown in chart. See Methodology.

Source: Pew Hispanic Center estimates based on augmented March Supplements to the Current Population Survey.


# Why are border apprehensions and inflows declining?



“Because of better enforcement and current economic circumstances, the flow has been reduced by more than half from the busiest years, proving that we are in a much different environment than we were before.” -- *DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano, Nov. 13, 2009*




# Apprehensions vs. U.S. employment (non-agric., de-trended)



**Source:** Bureau of Labor Statistics; Department of Homeland Security; Authors' calculations.

**Note:** Nonfarm payroll employment is expressed in deviations from long-run trend. Apprehensions are shifted 6 months forward. Employment and apprehensions have been seasonally adjusted by the Dallas Fed.

Intention to migrate to the United States, relative to reference year 2006 (*Yucatan, MMFRP 2009 survey*)




- **No** statistical difference in propensity to migrate between *2006* and *2007*
- By *2008*, potential migrants were **54%** less likely to be planning migration to the U.S.
- In *2009*, potential migrants were **2 times** less likely plan migration, relative to reference year of *2006*





# ***As U.S. economy recovers, migrant remittances increase***

Family remittances to Mexico: % annual change in dollars




*Enhancements to border enforcement:  
“Increasing penalties for illegal entry”*

**Operation Streamline:**  
“zero-tolerance” policy of prosecution and  
incarceration of apprehended aliens



# *Criminal prosecutions of immigrants are up under Obama, continuing Bush II policy*





*Formal deportations (vs. “voluntary departures”) have reached new records in each year of Obama’s presidency*

*2010 Fiscal Year:*

**392,862** people deported (a new record), of whom **195,772 (50%)** were classified as “criminal immigrants” (= 50% were economic migrants with no criminal record)

*2009 Fiscal Year:*

**389,000** deportations (also a new record)





## ***Federal court districts along the U.S.-Mexico border***

**Southern District of California** (courts in San Diego and El Centro)  
Border Patrol Sectors: San Diego, El Centro

**District of Arizona** (courts in Tucson and Yuma)  
Border Patrol Sectors: Yuma, Tucson


**District of New Mexico** (court in Las Cruces)  
Border Patrol Sector: El Paso

**Western District of Texas** (courts in El Paso, Alpine, and Del Rio)  
Border Patrol Sectors: El Paso, Marfa, Del Rio

**Southern District of Texas** (courts in Laredo, McAllen, and Brownsville)  
Border Patrol Sectors: Laredo, Rio Grande Valley

● — Operation Streamline Jurisdiction

# What happens to apprehended migrants



\*No or minimal detention; \*\* DOJ detention

Chart by Marc Rosenblum and Victoria Greenfield, MPI



# **“Raising the penalties” approach in Arizona (Tucson Sector)**

## **Goal:**

To reduce “voluntary departures” drastically and increase “formal removals” through criminal prosecution or administrative action, so migrants will have a record and authorities can escalate charges and jail time if migrant is caught again. If migrant is formally removed, there is a five-year bar to re-entry.

## **Current practice:**

**300** migrants being apprehended daily in Tucson Sector, of whom: **100** are processed through criminal justice system (70 per day thru “Operation Streamline”, and 30 on federal felony charges); **200** allowed to take “voluntary departure”


**Operation Streamline process:** Migrants agree to plead guilty to a federal misdemeanor (illegal entry). Most are sentenced to time served (the 24 hours they have been held; more complicated cases get 30-180 days of jail time.

# Operation Streamline: border-wide effects



Graph from "Assembly-Line Justice: A Review of Operation Streamline" by Joanna Lydgate of the Warren Institute at UC Berkeley School of Law (2010), available at [http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Operation\\_Streamline\\_Policy\\_Brief.pdf](http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Operation_Streamline_Policy_Brief.pdf).

# Operation Streamline's effects in Arizona





## ***Major constraints on expanding Operation Streamline are:***


- Lack of capacity in federal courts: not enough judges and courtroom space
- Lack of detention capacity: only **32,000 beds** available nationwide for immigration detainees (FY 2008)
- Cost: **\$125 per day** to keep an immigrant in federal custody

*Immigrant  
detention  
center in  
south Texas,  
operated by  
Corrections  
Corporation of  
America  
(CCA)*





# *The U.S. gulag of immigrant prisons, 2009*



## *The “attrition through (interior) enforcement” approach to immigration control*

Inducing undocumented immigrants to *leave* the U.S. by making it more difficult for them to find employment and housing; restricting their access to health care and transportation (confiscating vehicles, etc.); instilling fear





***The Obama administration is aggressively “auditing” suspected employers of unauthorized migrants (over 2,200 firms targeted since January 2009), but:***

- Audits (“silent raids”) have only driven unauthorized migrants to seek work at other businesses; migrants not removed from U.S.
- Worksite raids have mostly had the effect of breaking up immigrant families. Substitution of U.S.-born workers for immigrants in raided firms has been negligible.



## ***ICE raids on workplaces instill fear but don't affect decisions to migrate to the U.S.***

**8.1%** of migrants had witnessed a workplace raid;  
**17.6%** had a relative or friend arrested in a workplace raid

*Intends to migrate in 2009:*

**14.5%** of those who experienced raid  
**9.5%** of those with no raid experience

*(among economically active Yucateco migrants, aged 18-40,  
interviewed by MMFRP in 2009)*

# Most employers of unauthorized workers have not changed their hiring practices

*Current employer asked for some sort of document:*

Yes: 67.5%

No: **32.5%**

---

*In current U.S. workplace:*

Employer knew *for sure* that worker was authorized to work in U.S.: 30.7%

Employer *probably* knew that worker was authorized: 8.8%

Employer *probably* knew that worker was not authorized: 11.0%

Employer knew *for sure* that worker was not authorized: 49.6%


**60.6%**



*Interior  
enforcement  
creates a  
climate of fear  
in immigrant  
communities*

**¿Cuáles cosas  
más le  
preocupan a una  
persona que vive  
en los Estados  
Unidos sin  
documentos?**

**ir al hospital**



**ir de compras**



**ir a la escuela**



**ir al trabajo**



**manejar un coche**




**usar transporte  
público**



**andar en la calle**



## Things that most worry unauthorized migrants living in the U.S. (*by main place of residence*)



*Local police stops of immigrants have increased sharply in recent years*



- **26%** of U.S.-based Jalisco migrants had been stopped by police and questioned in last 12 months

*(MMFRP survey, Jan.-Feb. 2010)*

- **17%** of a national sample of Latino immigrants had been stopped and questioned by local police


*(Pew Hispanic Center survey, April 2009)*



# *The stock of unauthorized Mexican immigrants living in the U.S. has remained almost stable*

**Figure 4**

Estimates of the U.S. Unauthorized Immigrant Population from Mexico, 2000-2009  
(millions)



Notes: Bars indicate low and high points of the estimated 90% confidence interval (Table A3). The symbol \* indicates the change from the previous year is statistically significant.

Source: Pew Hispanic Center estimates based on residual methodology applied to March Supplements to the Current Population Survey. See Methodology.

# *Why so few returnees to Mexico since 2007?*

1. Fear of losing their U.S. job:  
Returning to Mexico even briefly would jeopardize their continued employment in U.S.
2. People are aware that the situation in Mexico is no better:  
*Q. Why don't you go back to Mexico?*  
“Because the work in Mexico is deficient as well. When I think about it, I want to go back, but I don't because of the situation that Mexico is in right now.”  
- -*Ramón, Tunkaseño migrant living in Anaheim, CA*
3. Border enforcement:  
Makes it costly and physically risky to reenter U.S. after a stay in Mexico. (“caging effect”)
4. Integration into U.S. society:  
Families increasingly rooted in U.S.: U.S.-born children in schools, church membership, social networks here

## 5. Migrant families have developed new survival strategies:



- Relying more heavily on family support networks, churches
- Reducing living expenses, by sharing housing, meal preparation, etc.
- Sending less money back to relatives in Mexico
- Seeking 2<sup>nd</sup> or 3<sup>rd</sup> jobs





# Why are relatively few Mexicans going home?

Perceptions of current economic situation in the U.S. and Mexico (among Jalisco migrants and potential migrants, January-February 2010)



# Main Conclusions

- Border enforcement discourages new migration mainly through its effect on “coyote” fees, creating stronger demand for people-smugglers. Direct effects of border enforcement-related knowledge and perceptions on probability of migration are relatively weak, statistically insignificant, or *positively* related to migration propensity.
- The Great Recession has strongly discouraged new migration from Mexico, both legal and unauthorized, by changing the cost-benefit calculus of migration. But for most, migration is only being postponed until the U.S. economy improves.
- Recession has reduced the capacity of some potential migrants to go north because U.S. relatives can no longer pay to hire coyotes.
- Some deterrent effect of border enforcement, affecting women more than men; but it operates only *in combination* with weak labor demand in the U.S. Potential migrants’ perceptions of border-crossing difficulty/danger have been largely stable since 2007, but their perceptions of the U.S. labor market have changed dramatically.

- No evidence that border fortifications are keeping unauthorized migrants out of the U.S. Migrants' success rates have been remarkably stable over time and across very different sending communities. More than 60% still get in on the first try, and all but 2-6% of those apprehended once succeed eventually.
- Migrants know more about physical fencing than any other border enforcement measure, but fencing is an extremely weak deterrent. Border Patrol manpower is more effective but still less important than natural hazards and border bandits.
- Entering through a legal port of entry has become a significant mode of entry in California and Texas but not in Arizona; especially used to cross women and children. High cost curbs wider use.
- No large-scale exodus of Mexican migrants from the U.S. due to the U.S. recession. Caging effects of employment insecurity in U.S. (risk of losing U.S. job if they return home) and of border enforcement causes migrants to staying put. No evidence that interior enforcement is driving decisions to return to Mexico.



## The counter-factual scenario:

*What if we hadn't fortified the border since 1994?*

- The federal debt would be about **\$30 billion** lower (= tax dollars that would not have been spent on border fortification)
- Perhaps **2 million Mexicans** would still be living in Mexico rather than the U.S. (= those who have settled permanently in the U.S. due to caging effect of border enforcement), and government spending at all levels to provide human services to those settled migrants and their U.S.-born children would be reduced commensurately.
- **7,000-14,000 people** might still be alive (= migrants who died attempting clandestine entry since 1995, high-end figure including estimate of undiscovered bodies of missing migrants)
- People-smugglers would be **hundreds of millions of dollars** poorer.

# Questions?





# *Comprehensive Immigration Reform?*





# Key elements of 2007 U.S. Senate immigration reform bill

## Border Security

- 370 miles of additional fencing on U.S.-Mexico border
- Increase in Border Patrol to 20,000 agents
- 80 high-tech electronic surveillance towers, UAVs, etc.
- Building facilities to incarcerate up to 27,500 aliens per day

*Border security “triggers” must be in place before anything else is implemented*

## Worksite Enforcement

- Mandatory electronic employee eligibility verification system
- Much higher financial penalties for employers

## Guestworker Programs

- 200,000 visas per year, to work in any industry; 2-year stay, renewable, with 1 year in home country between each stay
- AgJobs: special guestworker program for agriculture, up to 1.5 million visas during first 5 years

## Legalization of Undocumented Immigrants

- Most undocumented migrants already in U.S. eligible for temporary legal status if they pay \$5,000 fine + back taxes owed, pass background check
- Eligible to get “green card” after 8 yrs., U.S. citizenship after 13 years; must return to home country and reenter U.S. legally to qualify for green card

## Permanent legal immigrant admissions

- More than 50% of all green cards to be awarded through point system giving most weight to occupational skills, higher education, English fluency

# ***REPAIR (“Real Enforcement with Practical Answers for Immigration Reform”) Proposal (April 29, 2010)***

## **1. Tougher border enforcement measures**

- More Border Patrol agents + ICE agents at ports of entry
- More investment in technology and infrastructure

## **2. New system for workplace enforcement**

- all employers must enroll in verification system within 6 years
- biometric ID cards issued to all legal U.S. workers (embedded fingerprints or scans of hand veins)
- large increase in workplace inspection agents

## **3. Legalization of some portion of existing population of *indocumentados*; requirements to include:**

- Admit violating U.S. law
- Pay a fine for illegal entry (\$5,000 most likely)
- Pass criminal background check
- Pay any back taxes owed
- Wait 8 years before applying for LPR status (“green card”)

## **4. Regulating future flows of migrants**

- Two temporary worker programs, for agricultural and non-seasonal non-agricultural workers, with admissions tied tightly to changing labor market conditions; possible path to permanent resident status
- Automatically grant “green cards” to all immigrants receiving advanced degrees in science, math, engineering from U.S. universities
- Establish commission of “independent experts” to set quotas for employment-based permanent visas, by industry
- Clear the existing family-based immigration backlog over 8 years, by raising per country caps

## **5. State and local governments will be barred from enacting their own immigration laws**



*The Wall Street Journal*  
March 9, 2010

## **ID Card for Workers Is at Center of Immigration Plan**

**BY LAURA MECKLER**

Lawmakers working to craft a new comprehensive immigration bill have settled on a way to prevent employers from hiring illegal immigrants: a national biometric identification card all American workers would eventually be required to obtain. This “high-tech version of the Social Security card”



***Would replace:***

## **Electronic Employment Eligibility Verification Program (E-Verify)**

- Checks job applicants' Social Security numbers and immigration status against a federal data base
- Employer participation is voluntary, except for federal contractors
- **2.3%** of U.S. businesses are now enrolled in E-Verify
- System wrongly clears unauthorized workers **54%** of the time, because it can't detect identity fraud (i.e., borrowed documents)
  - *Westat Corp. evaluation study for Dept. of Homeland Security, January 2010*

PREFERENCE CATEGORY	Average wait time for Mexican nationals, with current backlogs
1 <sup>st</sup> (Unmarried, minor sons & daughters of US citizens)	12 years
2A (Spouses & children of Legal Permanent Residents)	6.5 years
2B (Unmarried, over-21 sons & daughters of LPRs)	192 years
3 <sup>rd</sup> (Married sons & daughters of USC's)	12 years
4 <sup>th</sup> (Brothers & sisters of Adult USC's)	13 years

## *Why the backlogs?*


Per-country limit for all visa categories is 25,620 per year

Example: If there are 256,000 applications from Mexican nationals in any given category, wait will be 10 years



# *Ties that bind: great potential for future family reunification migration from Mexico*


**% who have close relatives living in U.S.**



*Sources:* For “all Mexicans,” Pew Global Attitudes Project, national survey in Mexico, May-June 2009; for “high migration communities,” Mexican Migration Field Research and Training Program, Center for Comparative Immigration Studies, UCSD, surveys in Jalisco, Zacatecas, Oaxaca, Yucatan, 2005-2009.

# Needed (but politically unrealistic) changes in immigration system, to promote *legal* family reunification migration:

- exempt Mexican nationals from some visa ceilings to reduce backlogs and incentive for illegal immigration
- Increase total number of “green cards”




# Mixed-legal-status families are increasing rapidly

**Figure 9**

Children with at Least One Unauthorized Immigrant Parent, by Status, 2000-2009

*(millions)*



Note: Children are persons under age 18 who are not married.

Source: Pew Hispanic Center estimates based on augmented March Supplements to the Current Population Survey. See Methodology.