Category Archives: Naval ships & systems

Columbia – The Future of the U.S. FBM Submarine Fleet

January 13, 2017All Posts, Marine Technology, Military technology, National Security, Naval ships & systemsOhio Replacement Program, SSBN-826, Trident II, USS ColumbiaDrummer

Peter Lobner

On 14 December, 2016, the Secretary of the Navy, Ray Mabus, announced that the new class of U.S. fleet ballistic missile (FBM) submarines will be known as the Columbia-class, named after the lead ship, USS Columbia, SSBN-826 and the District of Columbia. Formerly, this submarine class was known simply as the “Ohio Replacement Program”.

Columbia-class SSBN. Source: U.S. Navy

There will be 12 Columbia-class SSBNs replacing 14 Ohio-class SSBNs. The Navy has designated this as its top priority program. All of the Columbia-class SSBNs will be built at the General Dynamics Electric Boat shipyard in Groton, CT.

Background – Ohio-class SSBNs

Ohio-class SSBNs make up the current fleet of U.S. FBM submarines, all of which were delivered to the Navy between 1981 and 1997. Here are some key points on the Ohio-class SSBNs:

Electric Boat’s FY89 original contract for construction of the lead ship, USS Ohio, was for about $1.1 billion. In 1996, the Navy estimated that constructing the original fleet of 18 Ohio-class SSBNs and outfitting them with the Trident weapons system cost $34.8 billion. That’s an average cost of about $1.9 billion per sub.
On average, each SSBN spend 77 days at sea, followed by 35 days in-port for maintenance.
Each crew consists of about 155 sailors.
The Ohio-class SSBNs will reach the ends of their service lives at a rate of about one per year between 2029 and 2040.

The Ohio SSBN fleet currently is carrying about 50% of the total U.S. active inventory of strategic nuclear warheads on Trident II submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). In 2018, when the New START nuclear force reduction treaty is fully implemented, the Ohio SSBN fleet will be carrying approximately 70% of that active inventory, increasing the strategic importance of the U.S. SSBN fleet.

It is notable that the Trident II missile initial operating capability (IOC) occurred in March 1990. The Trident D5LE (life-extension) version is expected to remain in service until 2042.

Columbia basic design features

Features of the new Columbia-class SSBN include:

42 year ship operational life
Life-of-the-ship reactor core (no refueling)
16 missile tubes vs. 24 on the Ohio-class
43’ (13.1 m) beam vs. 42’ (13 m) on the Ohio-class
560’ (170.7 m) long, same as Ohio-class
Slightly higher displacement (likely > 20,000 tons) than the Ohio class
Electric drive vs. mechanical drive on the Ohio-class
X-stern planes vs. cruciform stern planes on the Ohio-class
Accommodations for 155 sailors, same as Ohio

Design collaboration with the UK

The U.S. Navy and the UK’s Royal Navy are collaborating on design features that will be common between the Columbia-class and the UK’s Dreadnought-class SSBNs (formerly named “Successor” class). These features include:

Common Missile Compartment (CMC)
Common SLBM fire control system

The CMC is being designed as a structural “quad-pack”, with integrated missile tubes and submarine hull section. Each tube measures 86” (2.18 m) in diameter and 36’ (10.97 m) in length and can accommodate a Trident II SLBM, which is the type currently deployed on both the U.S. and UK FBM submarine fleets. In October 2016, General Dynamics received a $101.3 million contract to build the first set of CMCs.

CMC “quad-pack.” Source: General Dynamics via U.S. Navy

The “Submarine Shaftless Drive” (SDD) concept that the UK is believed to be planning for their Dreadnought SSBN has been examined by the U.S. Navy, but there is no information on the choice of propulsor for the Columbia-class SSBN.

Design & construction cost

In the early 2000s, the Navy kicked off their future SSBN program with a “Material Solution Analysis” phase that included defining initial capabilities and development strategies, analyzing alternatives, and preparing cost estimates. The “Milestone A” decision point reached in 2011 allowed the program to move into the “Technology Maturation & Risk Reduction” phase, which focused on refining capability definitions and developing various strategies and plans needed for later phases. Low-rate initial production and testing of certain subsystems also is permitted in this phase. Work in these two “pre-acquisition” phases is funded from the Navy’s research & development (R&D) budget.

On 4 January 2017, the Navy announced that the Columbia-class submarine program passed its “Milestone B” decision review. The Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM) was signed by the Navy’s acquisition chief Frank Kendall. This means that the program legally can move into the Engineering & Manufacturing Development Phase, which is the first of two systems acquisition phases funded from the Navy’s shipbuilding budget. Detailed design is performed in this phase. In parallel, certain continuing technology development / risk reduction tasks are funded from the Navy’s R&D budget.

The Navy’s proposed FY2017 budget for the Columbia SSBN program includes $773.1 million in the shipbuilding budget for the first boat in the class, and $1,091.1 million in the R&D budget.

The total budget for the Columbia SSBN program is a bit elusive. In terms of 2010 dollars, the Navy had estimated that lead ship would cost $10.4 billion ($4.2 billion for detailed design and non-recurring engineering work, plus $6.2 billion for construction) and the 11 follow-on SSBNs will cost $5.2 billion each. Based on these cost estimates, construction of the new fleet of 12 SSBNs would cost $67.6 billion in 2010 dollars. Frank Kendall’s ADM provided a cost estimate in terms of 2017 dollars in which the detailed design and non-recurring engineering work was amortized across the fleet of 12 SSBNs. In this case, the “Average Procurement Unit Cost” was $8 billion per SSBN. The total program cost is expected to be about $100 billion in 2017 dollars for a fleet of 12 SSBNs. There’s quite a bit if inflation between the 2010 estimate and new 2017 estimate, and that doesn’t account for future inflation during the planned construction program that won’t start until 2021 and is expected to continue at a rate of one SSBN authorized per year.

The UK is contributing financially to common portions of the Columbia SSBN program. I have not yet found a source for details on the UK’s contributions and how they add to the estimate for total program cost.

Operation & support (O&S) cost

The estimated average O&S cost target of each Columbia-class SSBN is $110 million per year in constant FY2010 dollars. For the fleet of 12 SSBNs, that puts the annual total O&S cost at $1.32 billion in constant FY2010 dollars.

Columbia schedule

An updated schedule for Columbia-class SSBN program was not included in the recent Navy announcements. Previously, the Navy identified the following milestones for the lead ship:

FY2017: Start advance procurement for lead ship
FY2021: Milestone C decision, which will enable the program to move into the Production and Deployment Phase and start construction of the lead ship
2027: Deliver lead ship to the Navy
2031: Lead ship ready to conduct 1^st strategic deterrence patrol

Keeping the Columbia-class SSBN construction program on schedule is important to the nation’s, strategic deterrence capability. The first Ohio-class SSBNs are expected start retiring in 2029, two years before the first Columbia-class SSBN is delivered to the fleet. The net result of this poor timing will be a 6 – 7 year decline in the number of U.S. SSBNs from the current level of 14 SSBNs to 10 SSBNs in about 2032. The SSBN fleet will remain at this level for almost a decade while the last Ohio-class SSBNs are retiring and are being replaced one-for-one by new Columbia-class SSBNs. Finally, the U.S. SSBN fleet will reach its authorized level of 12 Columbia-class SSBNs in about 2042. This is about the same time when the Trident D5LE SLBMs arming the entire Columbia-class fleet will need to be replaced by a modern SLBM.

You can see the fleet size projections for all classes of Navy submarines in the following chart. The SSBN fleet is represented by the middle trend line.

Source: U.S. Navy 30-year Submarine Shipbuilding Plan 2017

Based on the Navy’s recent poor performance in other major new shipbuilding programs (Ford-class aircraft carrier, Nimitz-class destroyer, Littoral Combat Ship), their ability to meet the projected delivery schedule for the Columbia-class SSBN’s must be regarded with some skepticism. However, the Navy’s Virginia-class attack submarine (SSN) construction program has been performing very well, with some new SSNs being delivered ahead of schedule and below budget. Hopefully, the submarine community can maintain the good record of the Virginia-class SSNs program and deliver a similarly successful, on-time Columbia-class SSBN program.

Additional resources:

For more information, refer to the 25 October 2016 report by the Congressional Research Service, “Navy Columbia Class (Ohio Replacement) Ballistic Missile Submarine (SSBN[X]) Program: Background and Issues for Congress,” which you can download at the following link:

https://fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/R41129.pdf

You can read the Navy’s, “Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal Year 2017,” at the following link:

https://news.usni.org/2016/07/12/20627

The Navy’s Troubled Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program is Delivering a Costly, Unreliable, Marginal Weapons System

December 18, 2016All Posts, Marine Technology, Military technology, Naval ships & systemsBreaking Defense, Congressional Research Service, frigate, GAO, General Accounting Office, LCS, Littoral Combat ShipDrummer

Peter Lobner

Updated 9 January 2020

The LCS program consists of two different, but operationally comparable ship designs:

LCS-1 Freedom-class monohull built by Marinette Marine
LCS-2 Independence-class trimaran built by Austal USA.

These relatively small surface combatants have full load displacements in the 3,400 – 3,900 ton range, making them smaller than most destroyer and frigate-class ships in the world’s navies.

LCS-2 in foreground & LCS-1 in background. Source: U.S. NavyLCS-1 on left & LCS-2 on right. Source: U.S. Navy

Originally LCS was conceived as a fleet of 52 small, fast, multi-mission ships designed to fight in littoral (shallow, coastal) waters, with roll-on / roll-off mission packages intended to give these ships unprecedented operational flexibility. In concept, it was expected that mission module changes could be conducted in any port in a matter of hours. In a 2010 Department of Defense (DoD) Selected Acquisition Report, the primary missions for the LCS were described as:

“…littoral surface warfare operations emphasizing prosecution of small boats, mine warfare, and littoral anti-submarine warfare. Its high speed and ability to operate at economical loiter speeds will enable fast and calculated response to small boat threats, mine laying and quiet diesel submarines. LCS employment of networked sensors for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) in support of Special Operations Forces (SOF) will directly enhance littoral mobility. Its shallow draft will allow easier excursions into shallower areas for both mine countermeasures and small boat prosecution. Using LCS against these asymmetrical threats will enable Joint Commanders to concentrate multi-mission combatants on primary missions such as precision strike, battle group escort and theater air defense.”

Both competing firms met a Congressionally-mandated cost target of $460 million per unit, and, in December 2010, Congress gave the Navy authority to split the procurement rather than declare a single winner. Another unique aspect of the LCS program was that the Defense Acquisition Board split the procurement further into the following two separate and distinct programs with separate reporting requirements:

The two “Seaframe” programs (for the two basic ship designs, LCS-1 and LCS-2)
The Mission Module programs (for the different mission modules needed to enable an LCS seaframe to perform specific missions)

When the end product is intended to be an integrated combatant vessel, you don’t need to be a systems analyst to know that trouble is brewing in the interfaces between the seaframes and the mission modules somewhere along the critical path to LCS deployment.

There are three LCS mission modules:

Surface warfare (SUW)
Anti-submarine (ASW)
Mine countermeasures (MCM)

These mission modules are described briefly below:

Surface warfare (SUW)

Each LCS is lightly armed since its design basis surface threat is an individual small, armed boat or a swarm of such boats. The basic anti-surface armament on an LCS seaframe includes a single 57 mm main gun in a bow turret and everal small (.50 cal) machine guns. The SUW module adds twin 30mm Bushmaster cannons, an aviation unit, a maritime security module (small boats), and relatively short-range surface-to-surface missiles.

Each LCS has a hanger bay for its embarked aviation unit, which is comprised of one manned MH-60R Sea Hawk helicopter and one MQ-8B Fire Scout unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV, a small helicopter). As part of the SUW module, these aviation assets are intended to be used to identify, track, and help prosecute surface targets.

That original short-range missile collaboration with the Army failed when the Army withdrew from the program. As of December 2016, the Navy is continuing to conduct operational tests of a different Army short-range missile, the Longbow Hellfire, to fill the gap in the SUW module and improve the LCS’s capability to defend against fast inshore attack craft.

In addition to the elements of the SUW module described above, each LCS has a RIM-116 Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM) system or a SeaRAM system intended primarily for anti-air point defense (range 5 – 6 miles) against cruise missiles. A modified version of the RAM has limited capabilities for use against helicopters and nearby small surface targets.

In 2015, the Navy redefined the first increment of the LCS SUW capability as comprising the Navy’s Visit, Board, Search and Seizure (VBSS) teams. This limited “surface warfare” function is comparable to the mission of a Coast Guard cutter.

While the LCS was not originally designed to have a long-range (over the horizon) strike capability, the Navy is seeking to remedy this oversight and is operationally testing two existing missile systems to determine their suitability for installation on the LCS fleet. These missiles are the Boeing Harpoon and the Norwegian Konigsberg Naval Strike Missile (NSM). Both can be employed against sea and land targets.

Anti-submarine (ASW)

The LCS does not yet have an operational anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capability because of ongoing delays in developing this mission module.

The sonar suite is comprised of a continuously active variable depth sonar, a multi-function towed array sonar, and a torpedo defense sonar. For the ASW mission, the MH-60R Sea Hawk helicopter will be equipped with sonobuoys, dipping sonar and torpedoes for prosecuting submarines. The MQ-8B Fire Scout UAV also can support the ASW mission.

Use of these ASW mission elements is shown in the following diagram (click on the graphic to enlarge):

Source: U.S. Navy

In 2015, the Navy asked for significant weight reduction in the 105 ton ASW module.

Originally, initial operational capability (IOC) was expected to be 2016. It appears that the ASW mission package is on track for an IOC in late 2018, after completing development testing and initial operational test & evaluation.

Mine Countermeasures (MCM)

The LCS does not yet have an operational mine countermeasures capability. The original complex deployment plan included three different unmanned vehicles that were to be deployed in increments.

Lockheed Martin Remote Multi-mission Vehicle (RMMV) would tow a sonar system for conducting “volume searches” for mines
Textron Common Unmanned Surface Vehicle (CUSV) would tow minesweeping hardware.
General Dynamics Knifefish unmanned underwater vehicle would hunt for buried mines

For the MCM mission, the MH-60R Sea Hawk helicopter will be equipped with an airborne laser mine detection system and will be capable of operating an airborne mine neutralization system. The MQ-8B Fire Scout UAV also supports the MCM mission.

Use of these MCM mission elements is shown in the following diagram (click on the graphic to enlarge):

Source: U.S. Navy

Original IOC was expected to be 2014. The unreliable RMMV was cancelled in 2015, leaving the Navy still trying in late 2016 to define how an LCS will perform “volume searches.” CUSV and Knifefish development are in progress.

It appears the Navy is not planning to conduct initial operational test & evaluation of a complete MCM module before late 2019 or 2020.

By January 2012, the Navy acknowledged that mission module change-out could take days or weeks instead of hours. Therefore, each LCS will be assigned a single mission, making module changes a rare occurrence. So much for operational flexibility.

LCS has become the poster child for a major Navy ship acquisition program that has gone terribly wrong.

The mission statement for the LCS is still evolving, in spite of the fact that 26 already have been ordered.
There has been significant per-unit cost growth, which is actually difficult to calculate because of the separate programmatic costs of the seaframe and the mission modules.
- FY 2009 budget documents showed that the cost of the two lead ships had risen to $637 million for LCS-1 Freedom and $704 million for LCS-2
- In 2009, Lockheed Martin’s LCS-5 seaframe had a contractual price of $437 million and Austal’s LCS-6’s seaframe contractual price was $432 million, each for a block of 10 ships.
- In March 2016, General Accounting Office (GAO) reported the total procurement cost of the first 32 LCSs, which worked out to an average unit cost of $655 million just for the basic seaframes.
- GAO also reported the total cost for production of 64 LCS mission modules, which worked out to an average unit cost of $108 million per module.
- Based on these GAO estimates, a mission-configured LCS (with one mission module) has a total unit cost of about $763 million.
In 2016, the GAO found that, “the ship would be less capable of operating independently in higher threat environments than expected and would play a more limited role in major combat operations.”
The flexible mission module concept has failed. Each ship will be configured for only one mission.
Individual mission modules are still under development, leaving deployed LCSs without key operational capabilities.
The ships are unreliable. In 2016, the GAO noted the inability of an LCS to operate for 30 consecutive days underway without a critical failure of one or more essential subsystems.
Both LCS designs are overweight and are not meeting original performance goals.
There was no cathodic corrosion protection system on LCS-1 and LCS-2. This design oversight led to serious early corrosion damage and high cost to repair the ships.
Crew training time is long.
The original maintenance plans were unrealistic.
The original crew complement was inadequate to support the complex ship systems and an installed mission module.

To address some of these issues, the LCS crew complement has been increased, an unusual crew rotation process has been implemented, and the first four LCSs have been withdrawn from operational service for use instead as training ships.

To address some of the LCS warfighting limitations, the Navy, in February 2014, directed the LCS vendors to submit proposals for a more capable vessel (originally called “small surface combatant”, now called “frigate” or FF) that could operate in all regions during conflict conditions. Key features of this new frigate include:

Built-in (not modular) anti-submarine and surface warfare mission systems on each FF
Over-the-horizon strike capability
Same purely defensive (point defense) anti-air capability as the LCS. Larger destroyers or cruisers will provide fleet air defense.
Lengthened hull
Lower top speed and less range

As you would expect, the new frigate proposals look a lot like the existing LCS designs. In 2016, the GAO noted that the Navy prioritized cost and schedule considerations over the fact that a “minor modified LCS” (i.e., the new frigate) was the least capable option considered.” The competing designs for the new frigate are shown below (click on the graphic to enlarge):

Source: U.S. NavySource: U.S. Navy

GAO reported the following estimates for the cost of the new multi-mission frigate and its mission equipment:

Lead ship: $732 – 754 million
Average ship: $613 – 631 million
Average annual per-ship operating cost over a 25 year lifetime: $59 – 62 million

Note that the frigate lead ship cost estimate is less than the GAO’s estimated actual cost of an average LCS plus one mission module. Based on the vendor’s actual LCS cost control history, I’ll bet that the GAO’s frigate cost estimates are just the starting point for the cost growth curve.

To make room for the new frigate in the budget and in the current 308-ship fleet headcount limit, the Navy reduced the LCS buy to 32 vessels, and planed to order 20 new frigates from a single vendor. In December 2015, the Navy reduced the total quantity of LCS and frigates from 52 to 40. By mid-2016, Navy plans included only 26 LCS and 12 frigates.

2016 Top Ten Most Powerful Frigates in the World

To see what international counterparts the LCS and FF are up against, check out the January 2016 article, “Top Ten Most Powerful Frigates in the World,” which includes frigates typically in the 4,000 to 6,900 ton range (larger than LCS). You’ll find this at the following link:

https://defencyclopedia.com/2016/01/02/top-10-most-powerful-frigates-in-the-world/

There are no U.S. ships in this top 10.

So what do you think?

Are the single-mission LCSs really worth the Navy’s great investment in the LCS program?
Will the two-mission FFs give the Navy a world-class frigate that can operate independently in contested waters?
Would you want to serve aboard an LCS or FF when the fighting breaks out, or would you choose one of the more capable multi-mission international frigates?

Update: 9 January 2020

A 5 April 2019 article in The National Interest reported:

“The Pentagon Operational Test & Evaluation office’s review of the LCS fleet published back in January 2018 revealed alarming problems with both Freedom and Independence variants of the line, including: concerning issues with combat system elements like radar, limited anti-ship missile self-defense capabilities, and a distinct lack of redundancies for vital systems necessary to reduce the chance that “a single hit will result in loss of propulsion, combat capability, and the ability to control damage and restore system operation…..Neither LCS variant is survivable in high-intensity combat,” according to the report.”

The article’s link to the referenced 2018 Pentagon DOT&E report now results on a “404 – Page not found!” message on the DoD website. I’ve been unable to find that report elsewhere on the Internet. I wonder why? See for yourself here: https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/no-battleship-littoral-combat-ship-might-be-navys-worst-warship-50882

I’d chalk the LCS program up as a huge failure, delivering unreliable, poorly-armed ships that do not yet have a meaningful, operational role in the U.S. Navy and have not been integrated as an element of a battle group. I think others agree. The defense bill signed by President Trump in December 2019 limits LCS fleet size and states that none of the authorized funds can be used to exceed “the total procurement quantity of 35 Littoral Combat Ships.” Do I hear an Amen?

For more information:

A lot of other resources are available on the Internet describing the LCS program, early LCS operations, the LCS-derived frigate program, and other international frigates programs. For more information, I recommend the following resources dating from 2016 to 2019:

“Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Background and Issues for Congress,” RL33741 (updated), Congressional Research Service, updated 17 December 2019: https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL33741/257

“Littoral Combat Ship and Frigate: Delaying Planned Frigate Acquisition Would Enable Better-Informed Decisions, “ GAO-17-323, General Accounting Office, 18 April 2017: https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-17-323

“Need to Address Fundamental Weaknesses in LCS and Frigate Acquisition Strategies,” GAO-16-356, General Accounting Office, June 2016: https://www.gao.gov/assets/680/677764.pdf

“Storm-Tossed: The Controversial Littoral Combat Ship,” Breaking Defense, November 2016. The website Breaking Defense (http://breakingdefense.com) is an online magazine that offers defense industry news, analysis, debate, and videos. Their free eBook collects their coverage of the Navy’s LCS program. You can get a copy at the following link: http://info.breakingdefense.com/littoral-combat-ship-ebook

Large Autonomous Vessels will Revolutionize the U.S. Navy

April 11, 2016All Posts, Automation & autonomous systems, Marine Technology, Military technology, National Security, Naval ships & systemsACTUV, anti-submarine warfare, autonomous vessel, Boeing, continuous trail, DARPA, DoD, Echo Ranger, Echo Seeker, Echo Voyager, Leidos, Phantom Works, Raytheon Modular Scalable Sonar System, Sea Hunter, Third Offset Strategy, U.S. Navy, UUVDrummer

Peter Lobner

In this post, I will describe two large autonomous vessels that are likely to revolutionize the way the U.S. Navy operates. The first is the Sea Hunter, originally sponsored by Defense Advanced Projects Agency (DARPA), and the second is Echo Voyager developed by Boeing.

DARPA Anti-submarine warfare (ASW) Continuous Trail Unmanned Vessel (ACTUV)

Source: DARPA

DARPA explains that the program is structured around three primary goals:

Demonstrate the performance potential of a surface platform conceived originally as an unmanned vessel.
- This new design paradigm reduces constraints on conventional naval architecture elements such as layout, accessibility, crew support systems, and reserve buoyancy.
- The objective is to produce a vessel design that exceeds state-of-the art manned vessel performance for the specified mission at a fraction of the vessel size and cost.
Advance the technology for unmanned maritime system autonomous operation.
- Enable independently deploying vessels to conduct missions spanning thousands of kilometers of range and months of duration under a sparse remote supervisory control model.
- This includes autonomous compliance with maritime laws and conventions for safe navigation, autonomous system management for operational reliability, and autonomous interactions with an intelligent adversary.
Demonstrate the capability of an ACTUV vessel to use its unique sensor suite to achieve robust, continuous track of the quietest submarine targets over their entire operating envelope.

While DARPA states that ACTUV vessel is intended to detect and trail quiet diesel electric submarines, including air-independent submarines, that are rapidly proliferating among the world’s navies, that detect and track capability also should be effective against quiet nuclear submarines. The ACTUV vessel also will have capabilities to conduct counter-mine missions.

The ACTUV program is consistent with the Department of Defense (DoD) “Third Offset Strategy,” which is intended to maintain U.S. military technical supremacy over the next 20 years in the face of increasing challenges from Russia and China. An “offset strategy” identifies particular technical breakthroughs that can give the U.S. an edge over potential adversaries. In the “Third Offset Strategy”, the priority technologies include:

Robotics and autonomous systems: capable of assessing situations and making decisions on their own, without constant human monitoring
Miniaturization: enabled by taking the human being out of the weapons system
Big data: data fusion, with advanced, automated filtering / processing before human involvement is required.
Advanced manufacturing: including composite materials and additive manufacturing (3-D printing) to enable faster design / build processes and to reduce traditionally long supply chains.

You can read more about the “Third Offset Strategy” at the following link:

http://breakingdefense.com/2014/11/hagel-launches-offset-strategy-lists-key-technologies/

You also may wish to read my 19 March 2016 post on Arthur C. Clarke’s short story “Superiority.” You can decide for yourself if it relates to the “Third Offset Strategy.”

Leidos (formerly SAIC) is the prime contractor for the ACTUV technology demonstrator vessel, Sea Hunter. In August 2012, Leidos was awarded a contract valued at about $58 million to design, build, and operationally test the vessel.

In 2014, Leidos used a 32-foot (9.8 meter) surrogate vessel to demonstrate the prototype maritime autonomy system designed to control all maneuvering and mission functions of an ACTUV vessel. The first voyage of 35 nautical miles (65.8 km) was conducted in February 2014. A total of 42 days of at-sea demonstrations were conducted to validate the autonomy system.

Sea Hunter is an unarmed 145-ton full load displacement, diesel-powered, twin-screw, 132 foot (40 meters) long, trimaran that is designed to a wide range of sea conditions. It is designed to be operational up to Sea State 5 [moderate waves to 6.6 feet (2 meters) height, winds 17 – 21 knots] and to be survivable in Sea State 7 [rough weather with heavy waves up to 20 feet (6 meters) height]. The vessel is expected to have a range of about 3,850 miles (6,200 km) without maintenance or refueling and be able to deploy on missions lasting 60 – 90 days.

Source: DARPA

Raytheon’s Modular Scalable Sonar System (MS³) was selected as the primary search and detection sonar for Sea Hunter. MS³ is a medium frequency sonar that is capable of active and passive search, torpedo detection and alert, and small object avoidance. In the case of Sea Hunter, the sonar array is mounted in a bulbous housing at the end of a fin that extends from the bottom of the hull; looking a bit like a modern, high-performance sailboat’s keel.

Sea Hunter will include sensor technologies to facilitate the correct identification of surface ships and other objects on the sea surface. See my 8 March 2015 post on the use of inverse synthetic aperture radar (ISAR) in such maritime surveillance applications.

During a mission, an ACTUV vessel will not be limited by its own sensor suit. The ACTUV vessel will be linked via satellite to the Navy’s worldwide data network, enabling it to be in constant contact with other resources (i.e., other ships, aircraft, and land bases) and to share data.

Sea Hunter was built at the Vigor Shipyard in Portland, Oregon. Construction price of the Sea Hunter is expected to be in the range from $22 to $23 million. The target price for subsequent vessels is $20 million.

You can view a DARPA time-lapse video of the construction and launch of Sea Hunter at the following link:

http://www.darpa.mil/attachments/ACTUVTimelapseandWalkthrough.mp4

Source: DARPA

In the above photo, you can see on the bottom of the composite hull, just forward of the propeller shafts, what appears to be a hatch. I’m just speculating, but this may be the location of a retractable sonar housing, which is shown in the first and second pictures, above.

You can get another perspective of the launch and the subsequent preliminary underway trials in the Puget Sound in the DARPA video at the following link:

http://www.darpa.mil/attachments/ACTUVTimelapseandWalkthrough.mp4

During the speed run, Sea Hunter reached a top speed of 27 knots. Following the preliminary trials, Sea Hunter was christened on 7 April 2016. Now the vessel starts an operational test phase to be conducted jointly by DARPA and the Office of Naval Research (ONR). This phase is expected to run through September 2018.

DARPA reported that it expects an ACTUV vessel to cost about $15,000 – $20,000 per day to operate. In contrast, a manned destroyer costs about $700,000 per day to operate.

Source: DARPA

You can find more information on the ACTUV program on the DARPA website at the following link:

http://www.darpa.mil/news-events/2016-04-07

If ACTUV is successful in demonstrating the expected search and track capabilities against quiet submarines, it will become the bane of submarine commanders anywhere in the world. Imagine the frustration of a submarine commander who is unable to break the trail of an ACTUV vessel during peacetime. During a period of conflict, an ACTUV vessel may quickly become a target for the submarine being trailed. The Navy’s future conduct of operations may depend on having lots of ACTUV vessels.

28 July 2016 update: Sea Hunter ACTUV performance testing

On 1 May 2016, Sea Hunter arrived by barge in San Diego and then started initial performance trial in local waters.

Source: U.S. Navy

You can see a video of Sea Hunter in San Diego Bay at the following link:

https://news.usni.org/2016/05/04/video-navys-unmanned-sea-hunter-arrives-in-san-diego

On 26 July 2016, Leidos reported that it had completed initial performance trials in San Diego and that the ship met or surpassed all performance objectives for speed, maneuverability, stability, seakeeping, acceleration, deceleration and fuel consumption. These tests were the first milestone in the two-year test schedule.

Leidos indicated that upcoming tests will exercise the ship’s sensors and autonomy suite with the goals of demonstrating maritime collision regulations compliance capability and proof-of-concept for different Navy missions.

4 October 2018 update: DARPA ACTUV program completed. Sea Hunter testing and development is being continued by the Office of Naval Research

In January 2018, DARPA completed the ACTUV program and the Sea Hunter was transferred to the Office of Naval Research (ONR), which is continuing to operate the technology demonstration vessel under its Medium Displacement Unmanned Surface Vehicle (MDUSV) program. You can read more about the transition of the DARPA program to ONR here:

https://www.darpa.mil/news-events/2018-01-30a

It appears that ONR is less interested in the original ACTUV mission and more interested in a general-purpose “autonomous truck” that can be configured for a variety of missions while using the basic autonomy suite demonstrated on Sea Hunter. In December 2017, ONR awarded Leidos a contract to build the hull structure for a second autonomous vessel that is expected to be an evolutionary development of the original Sea Hunter design. You can read more about this ONR contract award here:

https://blog.executivebiz.com/2017/12/leidos-secures-navy-contract-to-help-build-2nd-sea-hunter-autonomous-vessel/

Echo Voyager Unmanned Underwater Vehicle (UUV)

Source: BoeingSource: Boeing

Echo Voyager is the third in a family of UUVs developed by Boeing’s Phantom Works. The first two are:

Echo Ranger (circa 2002): 18 feet (5.5 meters) long, 5 tons displacement; maximum depth 10,000 feet; maximum mission duration about 28 hours
Echo Seeker (circa 2015): 32 feet (9.8 meter) long; maximum depth 20,000 feet; maximum mission duration about 3 days

Both Echo Ranger and Echo Seeker are battery powered and require a supporting surface vessel for launch and recovery at sea and for recharging the batteries. They successfully have demonstrated the ability to conduct a variety of autonomous underwater operations and to navigate safely around obstacles.

Echo Voyager, unveiled by Boeing in Huntington Beach, CA on 10 March 2016, is a much different UUV. It is designed to deploy from a pier, autonomously conduct long-duration, long-distance missions and return by itself to its departure point or some other designated destination. Development of Echo Voyager was self-funded by Boeing.

Echo Voyager is a 50-ton displacement, 51 foot (15.5 meters) long UUV that is capable of diving to a depth of 11,000 feet (3,352 meters). It has a range of about 6,500 nautical miles (12,038 km), and is expected to be capable of autonomous operations for three months or more. The vessel is designed to accommodate various “payload sections” that can extend the length of the vessel up to a maximum of 81 feet (24.7 meters).

You can view a Boeing video on the Echo Voyager at the following link:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L9vPxC-qucw

The propulsion system is a hybrid diesel-electric rechargeable system. Batteries power the main electric motor, enabling a maximum speed is about 8 knots. Electrically powered auxiliary thrusters can be used to precisely position the vessel at slow speed. When the batteries require recharging, Echo Voyager will rise toward the surface, extend a folding mast as shown in the following pictures, and operate the diesel engine with the mast serving as a snorkel. The mast also contains sensors and antennae for communications and satellite navigation.

Source: screenshot from Boeing video at link aboveSource: screenshot from Boeing video at link above

The following image, also from the Boeing video, shows deployment of a payload onto the seabed.Source: screenshot from Boeing video at link above

Initial sea trials off the California coast were conducted in mid-2016.

Boeing currently does not have a military customer for Echo Voyager, but foresees the following missions as being well-suited for this type of UUV:

Surface and subsurface intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)
ASW search and barrier patrol
Submarine decoy
Critical infrastructure protection
Mine countermeasures
Weapons platform

Boeing also expects civilian applications for Echo Voyager in offshore oil and gas, marine engineering, hydrography and other scientific research.

4 October 2018 update: Progress in Echo Voyager development

Echo Voyager is based at a Boeing facility in Huntington Beach, CA. In June 2018, Boeing reported that Echo Voyager had returned to sea for a second round of testing. You can read more on Echo Voyager current status and the Navy’s plans for future large UUVs here:

http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-boeing-echo-voyager-20180623-story.html

Echo Voyager operating near the surface with mast extended. Source. Boeing

Spearhead-class Joint High-speed Vessel (JHSV) Provides the Navy with an Express Delivery Service

May 30, 2015All Posts, Marine Technology, Military technology, Naval ships & systemsEPF, Expeditionary Fast Transport, JHSV, Joint High-Speed Vessel, Military Sealift Command, Spearhead, USNS Minninocket, USNS TrentonDrummer

Peter Lobner

Updated 4 September 2015 and 16 February 2016

Along San Diego Bay, you’ll see a great variety of military and civilian vessels. The San Diego Port District has posted a chart on Shelter Island to help tourists and locals identify the more common types of Navy ships that are based here. Occasionally, you might be treated to the sight of an uncommon vessel, such as the catamaran USNS Minninocket (JHSV-3), shown below. This ship is owned and operated for the Navy by the Military Sealift Command.

Source: Author photo

JHSV ships are fast, modest-sized, non-combatant vessels designed to transport about 600 tons troops and equipment. Their modular design enables rapid reconfiguration of the 20,000-ft2 cargo bay to support various missions. For example, a JHSV vessel can accommodate an Army or Marine Corps company-sized unit (typically 80 – 250 troops) and vehicles, or be reconfigured to transport up to 312 troops.

The vessel has a length of 338′ (103 m), a beam of 93’ 6” (28.5 m), and a draft of 12’ 7” (3.83 m), and a displacement of about 2,400 tons. The catamaran design of the hull and the location of the large cargo deck are evident in the following pictures:

Source: U.S. Navy

Ship propulsion is provided by four 12,200 hp (9.1 MW) diesel engines in the catamaran pods driving waterjets that deliver a maximum speed of about 43 kts. Range is about 1,200 miles at 35 kts. The ship has facilities for one helicopter. As of the FY 2015 budget, 11 JHSVs have been funded.

You can read a summary of this Navy ship program, including the status of resolving FY 2013 and FY 2014 recommendations for improvement and new FY 2015 recommendations, at the following link:

http://www.dote.osd.mil/pub/reports/FY2015/pdf/navy/2015jhsv.pdf

You can watch a short video on this intriguing vessel at the following link:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aWRNIXNGGjA

In 2016, the Navy plans to conduct shipboard tests of the BAE Systems prototype electromagnetic railgun aboard USNS Trenton (JHSV-5), including live firing GPS-guided hyper-velocity projectiles (HVP) at targets 20 miles or more away. While the JHSV is a non-combatant, it was chosen for this test program because of the availability of adequate space in the cargo hold and topside for the prototype weapon system. An artist rendering of the planned railgun installation is shown below.

Source: U.S. Navy

4 September 2015 update: Joint High-speed Vessel (JHSV) redesigned Expeditionary Fast Transport (EPF)

Now there’s a new root designator for U.S. Navy vessels: “E” for “expeditionary support.”

Navy Secretary Ray Mabus and Adm. Jon Greenert, Chief of Naval Operations, changed the designations of three kinds of ships to the new expeditionary support category. The JHSV joint high-speed vessels will become EPF, for expeditionary fast transport.

16 Feb 2016 Update: EPFs require structural upgrades to cope with heavy seas; operational suitability in question

The Navy has contracted for 10 of the shallow-draft Expeditionary Fast Transports (EPFs) from Austal USA, which constructs these ships at its Mobile, AL shipyard. Five EPFs have been delivered and have made deployments to Africa, the Middle East and the Far East. The 6^th ship, USNS Brunswick, was just delivered to the Navy on 14 January 2016. Four more ships (EPF-7 to EPF-10) remain to be delivered under the current contract. EPF-11 and -12 have been funded by Congress in the 2015 and 2016 omnibus appropriations bills, but contracts with the Navy remain to be finalized.

Operating as part of the U.S. Navy’s Military Sealift Command, EPFs are intended primarily for use in littoral waters. However, they are expected to be able to make fast open ocean transits and operate with other Navy units in the open ocean.

The lead ship, USNS Spearhead, was damaged in moderate seas while transiting the Atlantic en route to Europe in September 2014. The ship took a significant pounding from wave slamming onto the “forepeak”, which is the bottom of the foremost part of the flat hull section spanning the two catamaran hulls. Repairs to the ship cost about $511,000. The repairs included structural reinforcement of the bow, which added 1,736 pounds to the ship’s weight and displaced about 250 gallons of fuel.

Source: U.S. Navy

On 22 September 2015, Michael Gilmore, Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, issued the following report to the Secretary of Defense: “Follow-on Operational Test and Evaluation (FOT&E) Report on the Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV).”

Key points in this report related to the weak bow are:

There is a serious problem with the bow structure related to the ship’s Safe Operating Envelope (SOE), which is designed to limit wave impact loads on the bow structure.
- The Navy accepted compromises in the bow structure during construction of these ships.
- Multiple ships of the class have suffered damage to the bow structure, and repairs/reinforcements are in progress class-wide.
Operating the ship outside of the SOE or encountering a rogue wave that is outside of the current sea state limits can result in sea slam events that cause structural damage to the bow structure of the ship.
The SOE operational restrictions are major limitation that must be accounted for in all missions assigned to these ships. The following limits apply:
- At Sea State 3 or less (significant wave height up to 1.25 meters), the ship may operate up to its maximum speed
- At Sea State 4 (significant wave height up to 2.5 meters) the ship must slow to 15 knots.
- At Sea State 5 (significant wave height up to 4 meters) the ship must slow to 5 knots.
- Above Sea State 5, the ship can only hold position and await calmer seas.
The Navy has spent almost $2.4 million strengthening the bows of the first four vessels delivered since late 2012.
- The 5^th operating ship, the USNS Trenton, will be modified during its next planned shipyard visit.
- Later EPFs will be modified during construction, before delivery to the Navy.
There has been no heavy weather testing yet to verify if the fixes are sufficient.

In addition to the bow structural problems, Michael Gilmore’s report noted that the EPFs have the following significant problems:

The EPF cannot effectively inter-operate with a Mobile Landing Platform in the open ocean.
Unplanned limitations exist on launching a SEAL Delivery Vehicle (SDV) and associated support boats in the open ocean
Operational availability is limited primarily by the poor reliability of the Ship Service Diesel Generators, waterjets, and the Ride Control System (RCS).

You can download Michael Gilmore’s complete report at the following link:

http://news.usni.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/9-22-15-Follow-On-Operational-Test-and-Evaluation-FOTE-Report-on-the-….pdf

Short summary articles on these matters are available at the following links to Bloomberg Business and Seapower:

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-01-14/navy-s-fast-sealift-ships-can-t-stand-buffeting-from-high-seas

and

http://www.seapowermagazine.org/stories/20151019-epf.html

Severe ship damage from very high sea states and rogue waves is always a possibility for ships operating in the open ocean. However, the bow damage experienced by the EPFs operating in the open ocean points to underlying design and operational issues for this type of ship.

For additional commentary on problems associated with bow damage to vessels operating in the open ocean, I refer you to the short video at the following link:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8-QNAwUdHUQ