Category Archives: Nuclear Arms & Arms Control

Marine Nuclear Power: 1939 – 2018

In 2015, I compiled the first edition of a resource document to support a presentation I made in August 2015 to The Lyncean Group of San Diego (www.lynceans.org) commemorating the 60thanniversary of the world’s first “underway on nuclear power” by USS Nautilus on 17 January 1955.  That presentation to the Lyncean Group, “60 years of Marine Nuclear Power: 1955 –2015,” was my attempt to tell a complex story, starting from the early origins of the US Navy’s interest in marine nuclear propulsion in 1939, resetting the clock on 17 January 1955 with USS Nautilus’ historic first voyage, and then tracing the development and exploitation of marine nuclear power over the next 60 years in a remarkable variety of military and civilian vessels created by eight nations.

Here’s a quick overview at worldwide marine nuclear in 2018.

Source: two charts by author

In July 2018, I finished a complete update of the resource document and changed the title to, “Marine Nuclear Power: 1939 –2018.”  Due to its present size (over 2,100 pages), the resource document now consists of the following parts, all formatted as slide presentations:

  • Part 1: Introduction
  • Part 2A: United States – Submarines
  • Part 2B: United States – Surface Ships
  • Part 3A: Russia – Submarines
  • Part 3B: Russia – Surface Ships & Non-propulsion Marine Nuclear Applications
  • Part 4: Europe & Canada
  • Part 5: China, India, Japan and Other Nations
  • Part 6: Arctic Operations

The original 2015 resource document and this updated set of documents were compiled from unclassified, open sources in the public domain.

I acknowledge the great amount of work done by others who have published material in print or posted information on the internet pertaining to international marine nuclear propulsion programs, naval and civilian nuclear powered vessels, naval weapons systems, and other marine nuclear applications.  My resource document contains a great deal of graphics from many sources.  Throughout the document, I have identified the sources for these graphics.

You can access all parts of Marine Nuclear Power: 1939 – 2018 here:

Marine Nuclear Power 1939 – 2018_Part 1_Introduction

Marine Nuclear Power 1939 – 2018_Part 2A_USA_submarines

Marine Nuclear Power 1939 – 2018_Part 2B_USA_surface ships

Marine Nuclear Power 1939 – 2018_Part 3A_R1_Russia_submarines

Marine Nuclear Power 1939 – 2018_Part 3B_R1_Russia_surface ships & non-propulsion apps

Marine Nuclear Power 1939 – 2018_Part 4_Europe & Canada

Marine Nuclear Power 1939 – 2018_Part 5_China-India-Japan & Others

Marine Nuclear Power 1939 – 2018_Part 6_Arctic marine nuclear

I hope you find this resource document informative, useful, and different from any other single document on this subject.  Below is an outline to help you navigate through the document.

Outline of Marine Nuclear Power:  1939 – 2018.

Part 1: Introduction

  • Quick look:  Then and now
  • State-of-the-art in 1955
  • Marine nuclear propulsion system basics
  • Timeline
    • Timeline highlights
    • Decade-by-decade
  • Effects of nuclear weapons and missile treaties & conventions on the composition and armament of naval fleets
  • Prospects for 2018 – 2030

Part 2A: United States – Submarines

  • Timeline for development of marine nuclear power in the US
  • US current nuclear vessel fleet
  • US naval nuclear infrastructure
  • Use of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) in US naval reactors
  • US submarine reactors and prototype facilities
  • US Navy nuclear-powered submarines
    • Nuclear-powered fast attack submarines (SSN)
      • Submarine-launched torpedoes, anti-submarine missiles & mines
      • Systems to augment submarine operational capabilities
    • Nuclear-powered strategic ballistic missile submarines (SSBN)
      • Submarine-launched strategic ballistic missiles (SLBMs)
    • Nuclear-powered guided missile submarines (SSGN)
      • Cruise missiles and other tactical guided missiles
    • Nuclear-powered special operations submarines

Part 2B: United States – Surface Ships

  • US naval surface ship reactors & prototype facilities
  • US Navy nuclear-powered surface ships
    • Evolution of the US nuclear-powered surface fleet
    • Nuclear-powered guided missile cruisers (CGN)
      • CGN tactical weapons
    • Nuclear-powered aircraft carriers (CVN)
      • Carrier strike group (CSG) & carrier air wing composition
  • Naval nuclear vessel decommissioning and nuclear waste management
  • US civilian marine nuclear vessels and reactors
    • Operational & planned civilian marine vessels and their reactors
    • Other US civilian marine reactor designs
  • Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator (RTG) marine applications
  • US marine nuclear power current trends

Part 3A: Russia – Submarines

  • The beginning of the Soviet / Russian marine nuclear power program
  • Russian current nuclear vessel fleet.
  • Russian marine nuclear reactor & fuel-cycle infrastructure
  • Russian nuclear vessel design, construction & life-cycle infrastructure
  • Russian naval nuclear infrastructure
  • Russian nuclear-powered submarines
    • Submarine reactors
    • Nuclear-powered fast attack submarines (SSN)
      • Submarine-launched torpedoes & anti-submarine missiles
    • Strategic ballistic missile submarines (SSB & SSBN)
      • Submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM)
    • Cruise missile submarines (SSG & SSGN).
      • Cruise missiles
    • Nuclear-powered special operations subs & strategic torpedoes
    • Other special-purpose nuclear-powered subs
    • Examples of un-built nuclear submarine projects

Part 3B: Russia – Surface Ships & Non-propulsion Marine Nuclear Applications

  • Russian nuclear-powered surface ships
    • Surface ship reactors
    • Nuclear-powered icebreakers
    • Nuclear-powered naval surface ships
      • Nuclear-powered guided missile cruisers
      • Nuclear-powered command ship
      • Nuclear-powered aircraft carrier
      • Nuclear-powered multi-purpose destroyer
  • Russian non-propulsion marine nuclear applications
    • Small reactors for non-propulsion marine nuclear applications
    • Floating nuclear power plants (FNPP)
    • Transportable reactor units (TRU)
    • Arctic seabed applications for marine nuclear power
    • Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators (RTG)
  • Marine nuclear decommissioning and environmental cleanup
  • Russian marine nuclear power current trends

Part 4: Europe & Canada

  • Nations that operate or have operated nuclear vessels
    • United Kingdom
      • The beginning of the UK marine nuclear power program
      • UK current nuclear vessel fleet
      • UK naval nuclear infrastructure
      • UK naval nuclear reactors
      • UK Royal Navy nuclear-powered submarines
        • Nuclear-powered fast attack submarines (SSN)
          • Submarine-launched tactical weapons
        • Nuclear-powered strategic ballistic missile submarines (SSBN)
          • Submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM)
      • UK disposition of decommissioned nuclear submarines
      • UK nuclear surface ship and marine reactor concepts
      • UK marine nuclear power current trends
    • France
      • The beginning of the French marine nuclear power program
      • French current nuclear vessel fleet
      • French naval nuclear infrastructure
      • French naval nuclear reactors
      • French naval nuclear vessels
        • Nuclear-powered strategic ballistic missile submarines (SNLE)
          • Submarine-launched ballistic missiles (MSBS)
        • Nuclear-powered fast attack submarines (SNA)
          • Submarine-launched tactical weapons
        • Nuclear-powered aircraft carrier
      • French disposition of decommissioned nuclear submarines
      • French non-propulsion marine reactor applications
      • French marine nuclear power current trends
    • Germany
  • Other nations with an interest in marine nuclear power technology
    • Italy
    • Sweden
    • Netherlands
    • Canada

Part 5: China, India, Japan and Other Nations

  • Nations that have operated nuclear vessels
    • China
      • The beginning of China’s marine nuclear power program
      • China’s current nuclear vessel fleet
      • China’s naval nuclear infrastructure
      • China’s nuclear vessels
        • Nuclear-powered fast attack submarines (SSNs)
          • Submarine-launched tactical weapons
        • Nuclear-powered strategic ballistic missile subs (SSBNs)
          • Submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs)
        • Floating nuclear power stations
        • Nuclear-powered surface ships
      • China’s decommissioned nuclear submarine status
      • China’s marine nuclear power current trends
    • India
      • The beginning of India’s marine nuclear power program
      • India’s current nuclear vessel fleet
      • India’s naval nuclear infrastructure
      • India’s nuclear-powered submarines
        • Nuclear-powered fast attack submarines (SSNs)
          • Submarine-launched tactical weapons
        • Nuclear-powered strategic ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs)
          • Submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM).
      • India’s marine nuclear power current trends
    • Japan
  • Other nations with an interest in marine nuclear power technology
    • Brazil
    • North Korea
    • Pakistan
    • Iran
    • Israel
    • Australia

Part 6: Arctic Operations

  • Basic orientation to the Arctic region
    • Arctic boundary
    • Northern Sea Route
    • Northwest Passage
    • Arctic Territorial Claims
  • Dream of the Arctic submarine
  • US nuclear marine Arctic operations
  • UK nuclear marine Arctic operations
  • Canada nuclear marine operations
  • Russian nuclear marine Arctic operations
    • Russian non-propulsion marine nuclear Arctic applications
  • Current trends in nuclear marine Arctic operations

 

You Need to Know About Russia’s Main Directorate of Deep-Sea Research (GUGI)

The Main Directorate of Deep-Sea Research, also known as GUGI and Military Unit 40056, is an organizational structure within the Russian Ministry  of Defense that is separate from the Russian Navy.  The Head of GUGI is Vice-Admiral Aleksei Burilichev, Hero of Russia.

Source. Adapted from Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, http://eng.mil.ru/en/index.htm

Vice-Admiral Aleksei Burilichev at the commissioning of GUGI oceanographic research vessel Yantar. Source: http://eng.mil.ru/

GUGI is responsible for fielding specialized submarines, oceanographic research ships, undersea drones and autonomous vehicles, sensor systems, and other undersea systems.   Today, GUGI operates the world’s largest fleet of covert manned deep-sea vessels. In mid-2018, that fleet consisted of eight very specialized nuclear-powered submarines.

There are six nuclear-powered, deep-diving, small submarines (“nuclear deep-sea stations”), each of which is capable of working at great depth (thousands of meters) for long periods of time.  These subs are believed to have diver lockout facilities to deploy divers at shallower depths.

  • One Project 1851 / 18510 Nelma (aka X-Ray) sub delivered in 1986; Length: 44 m (144.4 ft.); displacement about 529 tons submerged. This is the first and smallest of the Russian special operations nuclear-powered submarines.
  • Two Project 18511 Halibut (aka Paltus) subs delivered between 1994 – 95; Length: 55 m (180.4 ft.); displacement about 730 tons submerged.
  • Three Project 1910 Kashalot (aka Uniform) subs delivered between 1986 – 1991, but only two are operational in 2018; Length: 69 m (226.4 ft.); displacement about 1,580 tons submerged.
  • One Project 09851 Losharik (aka NORSUB-5) sub delivered in about 2003; Length: 74 m (242.8 ft.); displacement about 2,100 tons submerged.

The trend clearly is toward larger, and certainly more capable deep diving special operations submarines.  The larger subs have a crew complement of 25 – 35.

Kashalot notional cross-section diagram. Source: adapted from militaryrussia.ru

Kashalot notional diagram showing deployed positioning thrusters, landing legs and tools for working on the bottom. Source: http://nvs.rpf.ru/nvs/forum

The Russian small special operations subs may have been created in response to the U.S. Navy’s NR-1 small, deep-diving nuclear-powered submarine, which entered service in 1969.  NR-1 had a length of 45 meters (147.7 ft.) and a displacement of about 400 tons submerged, making it roughly comparable to the Project 1851 / 18510 Nelma . NR-1 was retired in 2008, leaving the U.S. with no counterpart to the Russian fleet of small, nuclear-powered special operations subs.

GUGI operates two nuclear-powered “motherships” (PLA carriers) that can transport one of the smaller nuclear deep-sea stations to a distant site and provide support throughout the mission. The current two motherships started life as Delta III and Delta IV strategic ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs).  The original SSBN missile tubes were removed and the hulls were lengthened to create large midship special mission compartments with a docking facility on the bottom of the hull for one of the small, deep-diving submarines.  These motherships probably have a test depth of about 250 to 300 meters (820 to 984 feet).  They are believed to have diver lockout facilities for deploying divers.

General arrangement of a Russian mothership carrying a small special operations submarine.  Source:  http://gentleseas.blogspot.com/2015/08/russias-own-jimmy-carter-special-ops.html

Delta-IV mothership carrying Losharik.  Source: GlobalSecurity.org

The motherships also are believed capable of deploying and retrieving a variety of  autonomous underwater vehicles (AUVs), including the relatively large Harpsichord: Length: 6.5 m (21.3 ft.); Diameter 1 m (3.2 ft.); Weight: 3,700 kg (8,157 pounds).

Harpsichord-2R-PM. Source: http://vpk-news.ru/articles/30962

The following graphic shows a mothership carrying a small special operations sub  while operating with a Harpsichord AUV.

                       Source: https://russianmilitaryanalysis.wordpress.com/tag/9m730/

These nuclear submarines are operated by the 29th Special Submarine Squadron, which is based along with other GUGI vessels at Olenya Bay, in the Kola Peninsula on the coast of the Barents Sea.

Olenya Bay is near Murmansk.  Source: Google Maps

Russian naval facilities near Murmansk.  Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org

Mothership BS-136 Orenburg at Oleyna Bay.  Source: Source: http://www.air-defense.net/

The GUGI fleet provides deep ocean and Arctic operating capabilities that greatly exceed those of any other nation.  Potential missions include:

  • Conducting subsea surveys, mapping and sampling (i.e., to help validate Russia’s extended continental shelf claims in the Arctic; to map potential future targets such as seafloor cables)
  • Placing and/or retrieving items on the sea floor (i.e., retrieving military hardware, placing subsea power sources, power distribution systems and sonar arrays)
  • Maintaining military subsea equipment and systems
  • Conducting covert surveillance
  • Developing an operational capability to deploy the Poseidon strategic nuclear torpedo.
  • In time of war, attacking the subsea infrastructure of other nations in the open ocean or in the Arctic (i.e., cutting subsea internet cables, power cables or oil / gas pipelines)

Analysts at the firm Policy Exchange reported that the world’s undersea cable network comprises about 213 independent cable systems and 545,018 miles (877,121 km) of fiber-optic cable.  These undersea cable networks carry an estimated 97% of global communications and $10 trillion in daily financial transactions are transmitted by cables under the ocean.

Since about 2015, NATO has observed Russian vessels stepping up activities around undersea data cables in the North Atlantic. None are known to have been tapped or cut.  Selective attacks on this cable infrastructure could electronically isolate and severely damage the economy of individual countries or regions.  You’ll find a more detailed assessment on this matter in the 15 December 2017 BBC article, “Russia a ‘risk’ to undersea cables, Defence chief warns.”

http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-42362500

GUGI also is responsible for the development of the Poseidon (formerly known as Status-6 / Kanyon) strategic nuclear torpedo and the associated “carrier” submarines.

Poseidon, which was first revealed on Russian TV in November 2015,  is a large, nuclear-powered, autonomous underwater vehicle (AUV) that functionally is a giant, long-range torpedo.

 The Russian TV “reveal” of the Oceanic Multipurpose System Status-6 November 2015. Source: https://russianmilitaryanalysis.wordpress.com/tag/9m730/

It is capable of delivering a very large nuclear warhead (perhaps up to 100 MT) underwater to the immediate proximity of an enemy’s key economic and military facilities in coastal areas.  It is a weapon of unprecedented destructive power and it is not subject to any existing nuclear arms limitation treaties. However, its development would give Russia leverage in future nuclear arms limitation talks.

The immense physical size of the Poseidon strategic nuclear torpedo is evident in the size comparison chart below.

Source: http://www.hisutton.com/

The Bulava is the Russian submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM) carried on Russia’s modern Borei-class SSBNs.  The UGST torpedo is representative of a typical torpedo launched from a 533 mm (21 inch) torpedo tube, which is found on the majority of submarines in the world.  An experimental submarine, the B-90 Sarov, appears to be the current testbed for the Poseidon strategic torpedo.  Russia is building other special submarines to carry several Poseidon strategic torpedoes.  One is believed to be the giant, highly modified Oscar II submarine KC-139 Belogrod, which also will serve as a mothership for a small, special operations nuclear sub.  The other is the smaller Project 09851 submarine Khabarovsk, which appears to be purpose-built for carrying the Poseidon.

For more information on GUGI, Russian special operations submarines and other covert underwater projects, refer to the Covert Shores website created by naval analyst H. I. Sutton, which you’ll find at the following link:

http://www.hisutton.com/Analysis%20-%20Russian%20Status-6%20aka%20KANYON%20nuclear%20deterrence%20and%20Pr%2009851%20submarine.html

 

 

1962 Nuclear Test in the Pacific Near San Diego

Everyone has heard about the atmospheric and underground nuclear tests that were conducted at the Nevada Test Site (NTS) from 1951 to 1992. NTS, which is about 394 miles (634 km) north of San Diego, CA, was the site of 928 nuclear tests.

Operation Dominic, was a series of 31 atmospheric or underwater nuclear tests conducted by the U.S. from April to October 1962 after the Soviet Union resumed atmospheric testing. One of the Operation Dominic tests occurred near San Diego, in the waters of the Pacific Ocean 426 miles (685 km) west of San Diego, CA at latitude 31° 14.7 N and longitude 124° 12.7’ W. This was U.S. nuclear test #238, code named Swordfish.

Swordfish test site west of San Diego, CA. Source: Google maps

Swordfish was a live-fire test of a nuclear-armed RUR-5A ASROC (Anti-Submarine ROCket) that was armed with a W44 nuclear warhead with a yield estimated to be about 10 kilotons (kT).

Mark 12 eight-cell ASROC launcher. Source: U.S. Navy / Wikipedia

ASROC launch. Source: seaforces.org

This was an operational test of the ASROC weapons system and a weapons effects test. The test would validate the nuclear-armed ASROC, which was being widely deployed in the fleet. In addition, the test would help define the effects of the nuclear detonation on the target and on nearby elements of an anti-submarine surface attack unit. The weapons effects data were needed to help the Navy establish a tactical doctrine for ASROC warhead delivery. The test sought to clarify tactical matters such as:

  • Minimum delivery range (safe standoff distance), with varying degrees of damage to the launching ship
  • Restrictions due to radioactivity on subsequent ship maneuvers Degree to which data from the Navy’s traditional high-explosive shock tests of ships applied to nuclear explosions
  • Safe standoff distance for delivery of nuclear weapons from submarines

The test also sought to determine:

  • Impact of the detonation on the U.S. strategic hydro-acoustic detection system known as SOSUS (SOund SUrveillance System)
  • Validation of models for detecting and classifying underwater nuclear explosions
  • Long-term drift and diffusion of radioactive contamination in the ocean environment.

The test was conducted on 11 May 1962 by Joint Task Group 8.9, which was led by aircraft carrier USS Yorktown (CV-10), was comprised of 19 ships, two submarine and 55 naval aircraft. JTG 8.9 included three Gearing-class destroyers, the submarine USS Razorback (SS-394) and landing ship dock USS Monticello (LSD-35).

  • Monticello set the instrumentation array for the test,
  • One destroyer (Bausell) was positioned about one mile the blast to monitor surface effects and the crew was evacuated
  • The Razorback monitored underwater effects from a distance of about 2.5 miles.

The nuclear-armed ASROC was fired from the destroyer USS Agerholm (DD-826) at a target 2.5 miles (4,348 yards / 4 km) away.  After the booster rocket burned out, the W44 nuclear depth charge warhead separated and flew a ballistic trajectory to the target. After impacting the water, the warhead sank to a prescribed depth, believed to be about 650 feet (198 meters) for the Swordfish test, before detonating.

USS Agerholm in the foreground of the Swordfish test. Source: Navsource.org

View from a helicopter trailing the USS Yorktown, 9,850 yards (3 km) from the Swordfish test. Source: Federation of American Scientists, fas.org

You can watch a short video clip of the Swordfish test from the perspective of the helicopter trailing USS Yorktown here:

https://gfycat.com/FlimsyTallEland

You can watch a longer video on the Swordfish test at the following link:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EV5q_mlhaiM

You can read Test Director W.W. Murray’s detailed report, “Operation Dominic, Shot Swordfish, Scientific Director’s Summary Report,” dated 21 January 1963, here:

https://www.scribd.com/document/292806204/Swordfish-1962-Underwater-ASROC-Nuclear-Weapon-Test-Effects-Report

Some key points reported by the Test Director were:

  • The water above “surface zero” was left radioactively contaminated after the collapse of the plumes (and the base surge from the detonation).
  • For about an hour after an ASROC burst, the contaminated water left about surface zero will pose a radiological hazard of significance, even under the exigencies of a wartime situation.
  • Swordfish re-emphasized the role of the base surge as a carrier of radioactivity. A ship which maneuvers, following an ASROC burst, so as to remain at least 350 yards (320 meters) from the edge of the base surge will not subject its personnel to radiation doses in excess of peacetime test limits.
  • The contaminated water pool produced by an ASROC burst drifts with the current while it diffuses and decays radioactively.
  • After Swordfish, the pool was tracked for more than 20 days; in 20 days after the burst the center had drifted about 50 miles (80.5 km) south of surface zero and maximum surface radiation intensity measured 0.04 mr/hr.

A shorter summary on the Swordfish test is included Defense Nuclear Agency report DNA-6040F, “Operation Dominic – 1962,” (see p. 196 – 204), which you can read and download here.

http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a136820.pdf

All ASROC nuclear warheads were removed from service in 1989.

You’ll find a complete listing of all U.S. nuclear tests in the Department of Energy’s December 2000 report, “United States Nuclear Tests July 1945 Through September 1992,” (DOE/NV—209-REV 15), which you can read and download here.

https://web.archive.org/web/20061012160826/http://www.nv.doe.gov/library/publications/historical/DOENV_209_REV15.pdf

 

Many LLNL Atmospheric Nuclear Test Videos Declassified

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) has posted 64 declassified videos of nuclear weapons tests on YouTube. LLNL reports:

“The U.S. conducted 210 atmospheric nuclear tests between 1945 and 1962, with multiple cameras capturing each event at around 2,400 frames per second. But in the decades since, around 10,000 of these films sat idle, scattered across the country in high-security vaults. Not only were they gathering dust, the film material itself was slowly decomposing, bringing the data they contained to the brink of being lost forever.

For the past five years, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) weapon physicist Greg Spriggs and a crack team of film experts, archivists and software developers have been on a mission to hunt down, scan, reanalyze and declassify these decomposing films. The goals are to preserve the films’ content before it’s lost forever, and provide better data to the post-testing-era scientists who use computer codes to help certify that the aging U.S. nuclear deterrent remains safe, secure and effective.”

Operation Hardtack-1 – Nutmeg 51538. Source: LLNL

Here’s the link:

https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLvGO_dWo8VfcmG166wKRy5z-GlJ_OQND5

Update 7 July 2018:

LLNL has posted more than 250 declassified videos of nuclear weapons tests on YouTube.  The newly digitized videos document several of the U.S. government’s 210 nuclear weapons tests carried out between 1945 and 1962.  You’ll find these videos at the following link:

https://www.youtube.com/user/LivermoreLab/videos

 

Doomsday Clock Reset

This year is the 70th anniversary of the Doomsday Clock, which the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists describes as follows:

“The Doomsday Clock is a design that warns the public about how close we are to destroying our world with dangerous technologies of our own making. It is a metaphor, a reminder of the perils we must address if we are to survive on the planet.”

You’ll find an overview on the Doomsday Clock here:

http://thebulletin.org/overview

The Clock was last changed in 2015 from five to three minutes to midnight. In January 2016, the Doomsday Clock’s minute hand did not change.

On 26 January 2017, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Science and Security Board, in consultation with its Board of Sponsors, which includes 15 Nobel Laureates, decided to reset the Doomsday Clock to 2-1/2 minutes to midnight. This is the closest it has been to midnight in 64 years, since the early days of above ground nuclear device testing.

Two and a half minutes to midnight

The Science and Security Board warned:

“In 2017, we find the danger to be even greater (than in 2015 and 2016), the need for action more urgent. It is two and a half minutes to midnight, the Clock is ticking, global danger looms. Wise public officials should act immediately, guiding humanity away from the brink. If they do not, wise citizens must step forward and lead the way.”

You can read the Science and Security Board’s complete statement at the following link:

http://thebulletin.org/sites/default/files/Final%202017%20Clock%20Statement.pdf

Their rationale for resetting the clock is not based on a single issue, but rather, the aggregate effects of the following issues, as described in their statement:

A dangerous nuclear situation on multiple fronts

  • Stockpile modernization by current nuclear powers, particularly the U.S. and Russia, has the potential to grow rather than reduce worldwide nuclear arsenals
  • Stagnation in nuclear arms control
  • Continuing tensions between nuclear-armed India and Pakistan
  • North Korea’s continuing nuclear development
  • The Iran nuclear deal has been successful in accomplishing its goals in its first year, but its future is in doubt under the new U.S. administration
  • Careless rhetoric about nuclear weapons is destabilizing; for example, the U.S. administration’s suggestion that South Korea and Japan acquire their own nuclear weapons to counter North Korea

The clear need for climate action

  • The Paris Agreement went into effect in 2016
  • Continued warming of the world was measured in 2016
  • S. administration needs to make a clear, unequivocal statement that it accepts climate change, caused by human activity, as a scientific reality

Nuclear power: An option worth careful consideration

  • Nuclear power a tempting part of the solution to the climate change problem
  • The scale of new nuclear power plant construction does not match the need for clean energy
  • In the short to medium term, governments should discourage the premature closure of existing reactors that are safe and economically viable
  • In the longer term, deploy new types of reactors that can be built quickly and are at least as safe as the commercial nuclear plants now operating
  • Deal responsibly with safety issues and with the commercial nuclear waste problem

Potential threats from emerging technologies

  • Technology continues to outpace humanity’s capacity to control it
  • Cyber attacks can undermining belief in representative government and thereby endangering humanity as a whole
  • Autonomous machine systems open up a new set of risks that require thoughtful management
  • Advances in synthetic biology, including the Crispr gene-editing tool, have great positive potential, but also can be misused to create bioweapons and other dangerous manipulations of genetic material
  • Potentially existential threats posed by a host of rapidly emerging technologies need to be monitored, and to the extent possible anticipated and managed.

Reducing risk: Expert advice

  • The Board is extremely concerned about the willingness of governments around the world— including the incoming U.S. administration—to ignore or discount sound science and considered expertise during their decision-making processes

Prior to the formal decision on the 2017 setting of the Doomsday Clock, the Bulletin took a poll to determine public sentiment on what the setting should be. Here are the results of this public pole.

Results of The Bulletin Public Poll

How would you have voted?

Visualize the Effects of a Nuclear Explosion in Your Neighborhood

The Restricted Data blog, run by Alex Wellerstein, is a very interesting website that focuses on nuclear weapons history and nuclear secrecy issues. Alex Wellerstein explains the origin of the blog:

“For me, ‘Restricted Data’ represents all of the historical strangeness of nuclear secrecy, where the shock of the bomb led scientists, policymakers, and military men to construct a baroque and often contradictory system of knowledge control in the (somewhat vain) hope that they could control the spread and use of nuclear technology.”

You can access the home page of this blog at the following link:

http://blog.nuclearsecrecy.com/about-the-blog/

From there, navigation to recent posts and blog categories is simple. Among the features of this blog is a visualization tool called NUKEMAP. With this visualization tool, you can examine the effects of a nuclear explosion on a target of your choice, with results presented on a Google map. The setup for an analysis is simple, requiring only the following basic parameters:

  • Target (move the marker on the Google map)
  • Yield (in kilotons)
  • Set for airburst or surface burst

You can select “other effects” if you wish to calculate casualties and/or display the fallout pattern. Advanced options let you set additional parameters, including details of an airburst.

To illustrate the use of this visualization tool, consider the following scenario: A 10 kiloton nuclear device is being smuggled into the U.S. on a container ship and is detonated before docking in San Diego Bay. The problem setup and results are shown in the following screenshots from the NUKEMAP visualization tool.

NUKEMAP1NUKEMAP2NUKEMAP3

Among the “Advanced options” are selectable settings for the effects you want to display on the map. The effects radii increase considerably when you select lower effects limits.

So, there you have it. NUKEMAP is a sobering visualization tool for a world where the possibility of an isolated act of nuclear terrorism cannot be ruled out. If these results bother you, I suggest that you don’t re-do the analysis with military-scale (hundreds of kilotons to megatons) airburst warheads.

 

CIA’s 1950 Nuclear Security Assessments After the Soviet’s First Nuclear Test

The first Soviet test of a nuclear device occurred on 29 August 1949 at the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site in what today is Kazakhstan. In the Soviet Union, this first device was known as RDS-1, Izdeliye 501 (device 501) and First Lightning. In the U.S., it was named Joe-1. This was an implosion type device with a yield of about 22 kilotons that, thanks to highly effective Soviet nuclear espionage during World War II, may have been very similar to the U.S. Fat Man bomb that was dropped on the Japanese city Nagasaki.

Casing_for_the_first_Soviet_atomic_bomb,_RDS-1Joe-1 casing. Source: Wikipedia / Minatom Archives

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was tasked with assessing the impact of the Soviet Union having a demonstrated nuclear capability. In mid-1950, the CIA issued two Top Secret reports providing their assessment. These reports have been declassified and now are in the public domain. I think you’ll find that they make interesting reading, even 66 years later.

The first report, ORE 91-49, is entitled, “Estimate of the Effects of the Soviet Possession of the Atomic Bomb upon the Security of the United States and upon the Probabilities of Direct Soviet Military Action,” dated 6 April 1950.

ORE 91-49 cover page

You can download this report as a pdf file at the following link:

https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000258849.pdf

The second, shorter summary report, ORE 32-50, is entitled, “The Effect of the Soviet Possession of Atomic Bombs on the Security of the United States,” dated 9 June 1950.

ORE_32-50 cover page

You can download this report as a pdf file at the following link:

http://www.alternatewars.com/WW3/WW3_Documents/CIA/ORE-32-50_9-JUN-1950.pdf

The next Soviet nuclear tests didn’t occur until 1951. The RDS-2 (Joe-2) and RDS-3 (Joe-3) tests were conducted on 24 September 1951 and 18 October 1951, respectively.

India and Pakistan’s Asymmetrical Nuclear Weapons Doctrines Raise the Risk of a Regional Nuclear War With Global Consequences

The nuclear weapons doctrines of India and Pakistan are different. This means that these two countries are not in sync on the matters of how and when they might use nuclear weapons in a regional military conflict. I’d like to think that cooler heads would prevail during a crisis and use of nuclear weapons would be averted. In light of current events, there may not be enough “cooler heads” on both sides in the region to prevail every time there is a crisis.

Case in point: In late September 2016, India announced it had carried out “surgical strikes” (inside Pakistan) on suspected militants preparing to infiltrate from the Pakistan-held part of Kashmir into the Indian-held part of that state. Responding to India’s latest strikes, Pakistan’s Defense Minister, Khawaja Muhammad Asif, has been reported widely to have made the following very provocative statement, which provides unsettling insights into Pakistan’s current nuclear weapons doctrine:

“Tactical weapons, our programs that we have developed, they have been developed for our protection. We haven’t kept the devices that we have just as showpieces. But if our safety is threatened, we will annihilate them (India).”

You can see a short Indian news video on this matter at the following link:

http://shoebat.com/2016/09/29/pakistan-defense-minister-threatens-to-wipe-out-india-with-a-nuclear-attack-stating-we-will-annihilate-india/

 1. Asymmetry in nuclear weapons doctrines

There are two recent papers that discuss in detail the nuclear weapons doctrines of India and Pakistan. Both papers address the issue of asymmetry and its operational implication. However, the papers differ a bit on the details of the nuclear weapons doctrines themselves. I’ll start by briefly summarizing these papers and using them to synthesize a short list of the key points in the respective nuclear weapons doctrines.

The first paper, entitled “India and Pakistan’s Nuclear Doctrines and Posture: A Comparative Analysis,” by Air Commodore (Retired) Khalid Iqbal, former Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Pakistan Air Force was published in Criterion Quarterly (Islamabad), Volume 11, Number 3, Jul-Sept 2016. The author’s key points are:

“Having preponderance in conventional arms, India subscribed to ‘No First Use’ concept but, soon after, started diluting it by attaching conditionalities to it; and having un-matching conventional capability, Pakistan retained the options of ‘First Use.’. Ever since 1998, doctrines of both the countries are going through the pangs of evolution. Doctrines of the two countries are mismatched. India intends to deter nuclear use by Pakistan while Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are meant to compensate for conventional arms asymmetry.”

You will read Khalid Iqbal’s complete paper at the following link:

https://www.academia.edu/28382385/India_and_Pakistans_Nuclear_Doctrines_and_Posture_A_Comparative_Analysis

The second paper, entitled “A Comparative Study of Nuclear Doctrines of India and Pakistan,” by Amir Latif appeared in the June 2014, Vol. 2, No. 1 issue of Journal of Global Peace and Conflict. The author provides the following summary (quoted from a 2005 paper by R. Hussain):

“There are three main attributes of the Pakistan’s undeclared nuclear doctrine. It has three distinct policy objectives: a) deter a first nuclear use by India; b) enable Pakistan to deter Indian conventional attack; c) allow Islamabad to “internationalize the crisis and invite outside intervention in the unfavorable circumstance.”

You can read Amir Latif’s complete paper at the following link

http://jgpcnet.com/journals/jgpc/Vol_2_No_1_June_2014/7.pdf

Synopsis of India’s nuclear weapons doctrine

India published its official nuclear doctrine on 4 January 2003. The main points related to nuclear weapons use are the following.

  1. India’s nuclear deterrent is directed toward Pakistan and China.
  2. India’s will build and maintain a credible minimum deterrent against those nations.
  3. India’s adopted a “No First Use” policy, subject to the following caveats:
    • India may use nuclear weapons in retaliation after a nuclear attack on its territory or on its military forces (wherever they may be).
    • In the event of a major biological or chemical attack, India reserves the option to use nuclear weapons.
  4. Only the civil political leadership (the Nuclear Command Authority) can authorize nuclear retaliatory attacks.
  5. Nuclear weapons will not be used against non-nuclear states (see caveat above regarding chemical or bio weapon attack).

Synopsis of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons doctrine

Pakistan does not have an officially declared nuclear doctrine. Their doctrine appears to be based on the following points:

  1. Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent is directed toward India.
  2. Pakistan will build and maintain a credible minimum deterrent.
    • The sole aim of having these weapons is to deter India from aggression that might threaten Pakistan’s territorial integrity or national independence / sovereignty.
    • Size of the deterrent force is enough inflict unacceptable damage on India with strikes on counter-value targets.
  3. Pakistan has not adopted a “No First Use” policy.
    • Nuclear weapons are essential to counter India’s conventional weapons superiority.
    • Nuclear weapons reestablish an overall Balance of Power, given the unbalanced conventional force ratios between the two sides (favoring India).
  4. National Command Authority (NCA), comprising the Employment Control Committee, Development Control Committee and Strategic Plans Division, is the center point of all decision-making on nuclear issues.
  5. Nuclear assets are considered to be safe, secure and almost free from risks of improper or accidental use.

The nuclear weapons doctrine asymmetry between India and Pakistan really boils down to this:

 India’s No First Use policy (with some caveats) vs. Pakistan’s policy of possible first use to compensate for conventional weapons asymmetry.

2. Nuclear tests and current nuclear arsenals

India

India tested its first nuclear device on 18 May 1974. Twenty-four years later, in mid-1998, tests of three devices were conducted, followed two days later by two more tests. All of these tests were low-yield, but multiple weapons configurations were tested in 1998.

India’s current nuclear arsenal is described in a paper by Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris entitled, “Indian Nuclear Forces, 2015,” which was published online on 27 November 2015 in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Volume 71 at the following link:

http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1177/0096340215599788

In this paper, authors Kristensen and Norris make the following points regarding India’s nuclear arsenal.

  • India is estimated to have produced approximately 540 kg of weapon-grade plutonium, enough for 135 to 180 nuclear warheads, though not all of that material is being used.
  • India has produced between 110 and 120 nuclear warheads.
  • The country’s fighter-bombers are the backbone of its operational nuclear strike force.
  • India also has made considerable progress in developing land-based ballistic missile and cruise missile delivery systems.
  • India is developing a nuclear-powered missile submarine and is developing sea-based ballistic missile (and cruise missile) delivery systems.

Pakistan

Pakistan is reported to have conducted many “cold” (non-fission) tests in March 1983. Shortly after the last Indian nuclear tests, Pakistan conducted six low-yield nuclear tests in rapid succession in late May 1998.

On 1 August 2016, the Congressional Research Service published the report, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons,” which provides an overview of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program. You can download this report at the following link:

https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34248.pdf

An important source for this CRS report was another paper by Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris entitled, “Pakistani Nuclear Forces, 2015,” which was published online on 27 November 2015 in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Volume 71 at the following link:

http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1177/0096340215611090

In this paper, authors Kristensen and Norris make the following points regarding Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal.

  • Pakistan has a nuclear weapons stockpile of 110 to 130 warheads.
  • As of late 2014, the International Panel on Fissile Materials estimated that Pakistan had an inventory of approximately 3,100 kg of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and roughly 170kg of weapon-grade plutonium.
  • The weapons stockpile realistically could grow to 220 – 250 warheads by 2025.
  • Pakistan has several types of operational nuclear-capable ballistic missiles, with at least two more under development.

3. Impact on global climate and famine of a regional nuclear war between India and Pakistan

On their website, the organization NuclearDarkness presents the results of analyses that attempt to quantify the effects on global climate of a nuclear war, based largely on the quantity of smoke lofted into the atmosphere by the nuclear weapons exchange. Results are presented for three cases: 5, 50 and 150 million metric tons (5, 50 and 150 Teragrams, Tg). The lowest case, 5 million tons, represents a regional nuclear war between India and Pakistan, with both sides using low-yield nuclear weapons. A summary of the assessment is as follows:

“Following a war between India and Pakistan, in which 100 Hiroshima-size (15 kiloton) nuclear weapons are detonated in the large cities of these nations, 5 million tons of smoke is lofted high into the stratosphere and is quickly spread around the world. A smoke layer forms around both hemispheres which will remain in place for many years to block sunlight from reaching the surface of the Earth. One year after the smoke injection there would be temperature drops of several degrees C within the grain-growing interiors of Eurasia and North America. There would be a corresponding shortening of growing seasons by up to 30 days and a 10% reduction in average global precipitation.”

You will find more details, including a day-to-day animation of the global distribution of the dust cloud for a two-month period after the start of the war, at the following link:

http://www.nucleardarkness.org/warconsequences/fivemilliontonsofsmoke/

In the following screenshots from the animation at the above link, you can see how rapidly the smoke distributes worldwide in the upper atmosphere after the initial regional nuclear exchange.

Regional war cloud dispersion 1

Regional war cloud dispersion 2

Regional war cloud dispersion 3

This consequence assessment on the nucleardarkness.org website is based largely on the following two papers by Robock, A. et al., which were published in 2007:

The first paper, entitled, “Nuclear winter revisited with a modern climate model and current nuclear arsenals: Still catastrophic consequences,” was published in the Journal of Geophysical Research, Vol. 112. The authors offer the following comments on the climate model they used.

“We use a modern climate model to reexamine the climate response to a range of nuclear wars, producing 50 and 150 Tg of smoke, using moderate and large portions of the current global arsenal, and find that there would be significant climatic responses to all the scenarios. This is the first time that an atmosphere-ocean general circulation model has been used for such a simulation and the first time that 10-year simulations have been conducted.”

You can read this paper at the following link:

http://climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/pdf/RobockNW2006JD008235.pdf

The second paper, entitled, “Climatic consequences of regional nuclear conflicts”, was published in Atmospheric Chemistry and Physics, 7, pp. 2003 – 2012. This paper provides the analysis for the 5 Tg case.

“We use a modern climate model and new estimates of smoke generated by fires in contemporary cities to calculate the response of the climate system to a regional nuclear war between emerging third world nuclear powers using 100 Hiroshima-size bombs.”

You can read this paper at the following link:

http://www.atmos-chem-phys.net/7/2003/2007/acp-7-2003-2007.pdf

Building on the work of Roblock, Ira Helhand authored the paper, “An Assessment of the Extent of Projected Global Famine Resulting From Limited, Regional Nuclear War.” His main points with regard to a post-war famine are:

“The recent study by Robock et al on the climatic consequences of regional nuclear war shows that even a “limited” nuclear conflict, involving as few as 100 Hiroshima-sized bombs, would have global implications with significant cooling of the earth’s surface and decreased precipitation in many parts of the world. A conflict of this magnitude could arise between emerging nuclear powers such as India and Pakistan. Past episodes of abrupt global cooling, due to volcanic activity, caused major crop failures and famine; the predicted climate effects of a regional nuclear war would be expected to cause similar shortfalls in agricultural production. In addition large quantities of food might need to be destroyed and significant areas of cropland might need to be taken out of production because of radioactive contamination. Even a modest, sudden decline in agricultural production could trigger significant increases in the prices for basic foods and hoarding on a global scale, both of which would make food inaccessible to poor people in much of the world. While it is not possible to estimate the precise extent of the global famine that would follow a regional nuclear war, it seems reasonable to postulate a total global death toll in the range of one billion from starvation alone. Famine on this scale would also lead to major epidemics of infectious diseases, and would create immense potential for war and civil conflict.”

You can download this paper at the following link:

http://www.psr.org/assets/pdfs/helfandpaper.pdf

 4. Conclusions

The nuclear weapons doctrines of India and Pakistan are not in sync on the matters of how and when they might use nuclear weapons in a regional military conflict. The highly sensitive region of Kashmir repeatedly has served as a flashpoint for conflicts between India and Pakistan and again is the site of a current conflict. If the very provocative recent statements by Pakistan’s Defense Minister, Khawaja Muhammad Asif, are to be believed, then there are credible scenarios in which Pakistan makes first use of low-yield nuclear weapons against India’s superior conventional forces.

The consequences to global climate from this regional nuclear conflict can be quite significant and lasting, with severe impacts on global food production and distribution. With a bit of imagination, I’m sure you can piece together a disturbing picture of how an India – Pakistan regional nuclear conflict can evolve into a global disaster.

Let’s hope that cooler heads in that region always prevail.

 

 

Deadline – Espionage or Innocent Coincidence?

The March 1944 issue of Astounding Science Fiction magazine contained a short story by Cleve Cartmill entitled, Deadline, that may, or may not have revealed secrets related to the Manhattan Project. This short story was edited by MIT-educated John W. Campbell Jr.

ASF_March 1944 cover                             Source: Astounding Science Fiction

Cleve Cartmill’s notoriety after the publication of Deadline is described in The Encyclopedia of Science Fiction (http://www.sf-encyclopedia.com/entry/cartmill_cleve):

“He is best remembered in the field for one famous (but untypical) story, “Deadline” (March 1944 Astounding),which described the atomic bomb a year before it was dropped: in this near-future fable, the evil Sixa (i.e., Axis) forces are prevented from dropping the Bomb, and the Seilla (Allies) decline to do so, justly fearing its dread potential. US Security subsequently descended on Astounding, but was persuaded (truthfully) by John W.Campbell Jr that Cartmill had used for his research only material available in public libraries. Cartmill’s prediction made sf fans enormously proud, and the story was made a prime exhibit in the arguments about prediction in sf.”

I’ve been unable to find an online source for the full-text of Deadline, but here’s a sample of the March 1944 text:

“U-235 has been separated in quantity sufficient for preliminary atomic-power research and the like. They get it out of uranium ores by new atomic isotope separation methods; they now have quantities measured in pounds….But they have not brought it together, or any major portion of it. Because they are not at all sure that, once started, it would stop before all of it had been consumed….They could end the war overnight with controlled U-235 bombs……So far, they haven’t worked out any way to control the explosion.”

The status of the Manhattan Project’s nuclear weapons infrastructure at the time that Deadline was published in March 1944 is outlined below.

  • The initial criticality at the world’s first nuclear reactor, the CP-1 pile in Chicago, occurred on 2 December 1942.
  • The initial criticality at the world’s second nuclear reactor, the X-10 Graphite Reactor in Oak Ridge (also known as the Clinton pile and the X-10-pile), and the first reactor designed for continuous operation, occurred 4 November 1943. X-10 produced its first plutonium in early 1944.
  • The initial criticality of the first large-scale production reactor, Hanford B, occurred in September 1944. This was followed by Hanford D in December 1944, and Hanford F in February 1945.
  • Initial operation of the first production-scale thermal diffusion plant (S-50 at Oak Ridge) began in January 1945, delivering 0.8 – 1.4% enriched uranium initially to the Y-12 calutrons, and later to the K-25 gaseous diffusion plant.
  • Initial operation of the first production-scale gaseous diffusion plant (K-25 at Oak Ridge) began operation in February 1945, delivering uranium enriched up to about 23% to the Y-12 calutrons
  • The Y-12 calutrons began operation in February 1945 with feed from S-50, and later from K-25. The calutrons provided uranium at the enrichment needed for the first atomic bombs.
  • The Trinity nuclear test occurred on 16 July 1945
  • The Little Boy uranium bomb was dropped on Hiroshima on 6 August 1945
  • The Fat Man plutonium bomb was dropped on Nagasaki on 9 August 1945

You can read more about of Deadline, including reaction at Los Alamos to this short story, on Wikipedia at the following link:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deadline_(science_fiction_story)

You also can download, “The Astounding Investigation: The Manhattan Project’s Confrontation With Science Fiction,” by Albert Berger at the following link:

https://www.gwern.net/docs/1984-berger.pdf

This investigation report, prepared by Astounding Science Fiction, identifies a number of sci-fi stories from 1934 to 1944 that included references to atomic weapons in their story lines, so Deadline was not the first to do so. Regarding the source of the technical information used in Deadline, the investigation report notes:

“However, when questioned as to the source of the technical material in “Deadline,” the references to U-235 separation, and to bomb and fuse design, Cartmill ‘explained that he took the major portion of it directly from letters sent to him by John Campbell…and a minor portion of it from his own general knowledge.’”

While Deadline may have angered many Manhattan Project Military Intelligence senior security officers, neither Cartmill nor Campbell were ever charged with a crime. The investigation noted that stories like Deadline could cause unwanted public speculation about actual classified projects. In addition, such stories might help people working in compartmented classified programs to get a better understanding of the broader context of their work.

I don’t think there was any espionage involved, but, for its time, Deadline provided very interesting insights into a fictional nuclear weapons project. What do you think?

Update on North Korea’s Sinpo (Gorae) Submarine and KN-11 SLBM

In the presentation files from my 5 August 2015 talk, 60 Years of Marine Nuclear Power, I noted that, while North Korea has a program to develop nuclear-armed submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), it appears that their current focus is on installing these missiles on conventionally-powered submarines. The particular conventional missile-launching submarines (SSBs) identified were a refurbished Russian-designed Golf II-class SSB and a new, small indigenous SSB provisionally named Sinpo, for the shipyard where it was observed, or Gorae. Both the refurbished Golf II and the new Sinpo (Gorae) have missile tubes in the sail and are capable of launching missiles while submerged. You will find my presentation files on the Lyncean website under the Past Meetings tab. The direct link to the file containing information on the North Korean program is listed below:

https://lynceans.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Part-4_UK-France-Others-60-yrs-of-marine-nuc-power.pdf

On 24 August 2016, North Korea launched a KN-11 ballistic missile from a submerged launcher, likely a submarine. The KN-11 missile flew 500 km (310 miles) downrange from the launch point into the Sea of Japan.

KN-11 launchSource: An undated photo from North Korean Central News Agency, “underwater test-fire of strategic submarine ballistic missile”

Range of the missile actually may be considerably greater because it appears to have been launched on a “lofted trajectory” that achieved a much higher apogee than normally would be associated with a maximum range ballistic flight. A similar higher-than-normal apogee was observed in the 21 July 2016 flight test of North Korea’s BM25 Musudan land-based, mobile, intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM), which flew 402 km (250 miles) downrange, but reached an apogee of 1,400 km (870 miles). The extra energy required for the KN-11 and Musudan to reach an unusually high apogee would translate directly into greater downrange distance on a maximum range ballistic flight.

You can see a summary of North Korea’s KN-11 test program on the Wikipedia website at the following link:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/KN-11#First_KN-11_Complete_Success_Test

For the best analysis of the Sinpo (Gorae) SSB and the KN-11 SLBM, I refer you to H. I. Sutton’s Covert Shores website at the following link:

http://www.hisutton.com/Analysis%20-%20Sinpo%20Class%20Ballistic%20Missile%20Sub.html

Sinpo_Gorae SSB_SuttonSource: H. I. Sutton Covert Shores

Sutton comments on the small size of the Sinpo (Gorae) SSB:

“It seems that she is built to the requirement of being the smallest possible boat to carry an NK-11……This reinforces the view that she is only a test boat with limited operational capability at most.”

While North Korea’s SSBs and SLBMs are works in progress, I think we are seeing substantial evidence that significant progress is being made on the submarine and the delivery vehicle. A big unknown is the development status of an operational nuclear warhead for the NK-11 missile. On 6 January 2016, North Korea conducted its fourth nuclear test. It has been reported that the yield from this test was in the 10-kiloton range. For comparison, the Little Boy bomb dropped on Hiroshima had a yield of about 15 kilotons. You can find a summary of North Korea’s nuclear tests on the Wikipedia website at the following link:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_nuclear_weapons_tests_of_North_Korea

In the 29 Aug – 11 Sep 2016 issue of Aviation Week and Space Technology magazine, Daryl Kimball of the Arms Control Association is quoted as saying:

“North Korea’s accelerated pace of ballistic missile testing is definitely worrisome,” Kimball says. “They have not necessarily perfected some of these systems to the point where they are effective military systems. That said, if nothing is done to halt further ballistic missile testing, they’re going to eventually – and I mean within a few years – develop a rudimentary long-range capability to deliver a nuclear warhead.”

For quite some time, there has been speculation of technical collaboration between Iran and North Korea on development of long-range missiles, and perhaps nuclear weapons. North Korea’s credibility as a technology partner has been enhanced by their January 2016 successful nuclear test and the more recent tests of the KN-11 and BM25 delivery vehicles.