Category Archives: National Security

New From The National Academies Press

Peter Lobner

My 14 March 2015 post provided an introduction to The National Academies Press (NAP), which is a very good source for reports and other documents on the following topics:

  • Agriculture
  • Behavioral & social sciences
  • Biographies & autobiographies
  • Biology & life sciences
  • Computers & information technology
  • Conflict & security issues
  • Earth sciences
  • Education
  • Energy & energy conservation
  • Engineering & technology
  • Environment & environmental studies
  • Food & nutrition
  • Health & medicine
  • Industry & labor
  • Mathematics, chemistry & physics
  • Policy for science & technology
  • Space & aeronautics
  • Transportation

Most of the NAP reports can be downloaded for free as pdf files if you establish a MyNAP account. If you haven’t set up such an account, you can do so at the following link:

http://www.nap.edu/content/using-mynap

With this account, you also can get e-mail notifications of new NAP reports.

For those of you who have not set up a MyNAP account, here are several new NAP reports that I found to be interesting.

Infusing Ethics into the Development of Engineers (2016)

Ethical practice in engineering is critical for ensuring public trust in the field and in its practitioners, especially as engineers increasingly tackle international and socially complex problems that combine technical and ethical challenges. This report aims to raise awareness of the variety of exceptional programs and strategies for improving engineers’ understanding of ethical and social issues and provides a resource for those who seek to improve ethical development of engineers at their own institutions.

NAP-infuse engineers  Source: NAP

Reducing the Use of Highly Enriched Uranium in Civilian Research Reactors (2016)

Today, 74 civilian research reactors around the world, including 8 in the U.S., use or are planning to use HEU fuel. In the past decades, many civilian reactors around the world have been either shut down or converted from HEU to low enriched uranium fuel. Despite this progress, the large number of remaining HEU-fueled reactors demonstrates that further progress is needed on a worldwide scale.

Print  Source: NAP

Enhancing Participation in the U.S. Global Change Research Program (2016)

The U.S. Global Change Research Program (USGCRP) is a collection of 13 Federal entities charged by law to assist the U.S. and the world to understand, assess, predict, and respond to human-induced and natural processes of global change. As the understanding of global change has evolved over the past decades and as demand for scientific information on global change has increased, the USGCRP has increasingly focused on research that can inform decisions to cope with current climate variability and change, to reduce the magnitude of future changes, and to prepare for changes projected over the coming decades.

NAP-global change  Source: NAP

Frontiers of Engineering – Reports on Leading-Edge Engineering from the 2015 Symposium (2016)

This volume presents papers on the following topics covered at the National Academy of Engineering’s 2015 U.S. Frontiers of Engineering Symposium:

  • Cyber security and privacy
  • Engineering the search for Earth-like exoplanets
  • Optical and mechanical metamaterials
  • Forecasting natural disasters

NAP-frontiers of engg 2015  Source: NAP

There are many other annual reports in the NAP “Frontiers of Engineering” series, dating back to at least 1997, and covering many other engineering topics.

I hope you’ll take some time and browse the NAP library for documents that are of interest to you. You can start your browsing, without a MyNAP account, at the following link:

http://www.nap.edu

The Doomsday Clock, the Iraq War and the War Scare of 1983

Peter Lobner

The Doomsday Clock

On 26 January 2016, The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Science and Security Board announced that the minute hand of its Doomsday Clock will remain at three minutes to midnight in spite of recent progress with the Iran nuclear agreement and the United Nations Climate Change Conference in Paris (COP 21).

Three minutes to midnight

The Science and Security Board gave the following rationale:

“Last year, the Science and Security Board moved the Doomsday Clock forward to three minutes to midnight, noting: ‘The probability of global catastrophe is very high, and the actions needed to reduce the risks of disaster must be taken very soon.’ That probability has not been reduced. The Clock ticks. Global danger looms. Wise leaders should act—immediately.”

You can read their complete announcement at the following link:

http://thebulletin.org/press-release/doomsday-clock-hands-remain-unchanged-despite-iran-deal-and-paris-talks9122

Also on this website, you will find a detailed chronology of the changes in the Doomsday Clock since its inception in 1947. The following link will take you directly to this timeline:

http://thebulletin.org/timeline

From the beginning, the Doomsday Clock has been a measure of the perceived risk to civilization of nuclear annihilation. In 2007, the Science and Security Board added climate change because of its perceived significant risk to civilization.

Another view of the Doomsday Clock timeline is available in Wikipedia at the following link:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Doomsday_Clock

Here you will find the following timeline chart and a compact tabulation of the changes over the years.

Doomsday_Clock_graph

The Iraq War

On 25 January 2016, Stephen Colbert interviewed former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, focusing on the Iraq War and the state of knowledge leading up to the decision to go to war. Donald Rumsfeld had previously addressed the state of U.S. intelligence on Iraq in terms of “known knowns” (i.e., things on which we believe we have adequate intelligence), “known unknowns” (i.e., things on which we believe we do not have adequate, or any, intelligence), and “unknown unknowns” (i.e., things we don’t even know we should be concerned about). Stephen Colbert then asked about “unknown knowns”, which he defined as, “things we know, but choose not to let other people know.” The implication was that our leaders in the military and the Executive Branch had important information that they knew had a bearing on the decision to go to war with Iraq, but this information was unknown to other stakeholders in that decision; namely, most members of Congress and the American people. Then the U.S. went to war with Iraq on 20 March 2003. The Doomsday Clock remained at 7 minutes before midnight, even though the U.S. had just saved the world from Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction.

You can view Stephen Colbert’s interview with Donald Rumsfeld at the following link:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4Z3z7DvoA-M

The War Scare of 1983

I need to expand on Donald Rumsfeld’s and Stephen Colbert’s categories for the state of U.S. intelligence by adding the following: “unknown, should have known better.” I define this as a serious, but avoidable, blunder known only at the highest levels and withheld from the public.

As an example of an “unknown, should have known better,” I present the “War Scare of 1983”. Remember that? I’d be quite surprised if you were even remotely aware of it when it occurred.

NATO forces conducted regular military exercises intended to improve their ability to execute war plans designed to counter a Soviet invasion of Europe. It now appears that only a few high-ranking people in the West knew that some of the Soviet leadership had misinterpreted NATO exercises conducted in the fall of 1983 as a prelude to an actual attack.

To set the stage, note in the timeline chart above that the Doomsday Clock had been reset from 7 minutes to 4 minutes before midnight in early 1981. This was a time of generally heightened tensions between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Perhaps as a consequence, the Soviets appear to have overreacted when they shot down Korean Airlines flight 007 in August 1983 after it strayed into Russian airspace near Sakhalin Island in the Russian Far East. Some believe that Soviet air defense forces had mistaken this civilian flight for a USAF RC-135 surveillance aircraft that previously had flown a similar route.

In the fall of 1983, the annual NATO exercise was known as Autumn Forge 83, consisting of at least six exercises. The final exercise, Able Archer 83, was a nuclear command and control exercise intended to simulate an escalating conflict with the Soviet Union leading to the simulated use of nuclear weapons by NATO. Overall, Autumn Forge 83 was a larger exercise than those conducted in previous years and Able Archer 83 was using new nuclear weapons command and control procedures.

In a 21 May 2013 article posted on The National Security Archives website entitled, The 1983 War Scare: “The Last Paroxysm” of the Cold War Part II”, Nate Jones includes the following diagram from an unclassified 9 September 1983 briefing showing the large scale of the Autumn Forge 83 exercise.

Autumn Forge Map

You can read the complete article at the following link:

http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB427/

A declassified After Action Report issued by the Strategic Air Command (SAC) Seventh Air Division Headquarters on 1 December 1983 addressed the NATO activities conducted as part of Able Archer 83, but presented no information on Soviet reactions during or following the exercise. This After Action Report is available at the following link:

http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB427/docs/7.%20Exercise%20Able%20Archer%2083%20After%20Action%20Report%201%20December%201983.pdf

I first became aware of the significance of Able Archer 83 via John Prados’ article, “The War Scare of 1983,” in The Quarterly Journal of Military History, Spring 1997 (Vol. 9, Issue 3).

In a 2007 article entitled, “A Cold War Conundrum: The 1983 Soviet War Scare,” author Benjamin Fischer attributed the following statement to Oleg Gordievsky, a KGB colonel who defected to the UK in 1985:

“In the tense atmosphere generated by the crises and rhetoric of the past few months, the KGB concluded that American forces had been placed on alert–and might even have begun the countdown to war…. The world did not quite reach the edge of the nuclear abyss during Operation RYAN. But during ABLE ARCHER 83 it had, without realizing it, come frighteningly close–certainly closer than at any time since the Cuban missile crisis of 1962.”

You can read the complete article in the CIA online library at the following link:

https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/a-cold-war-conundrum/source.htm#HEADING1-12

A Special National Intelligence Estimate entitled, “Implications of Recent Soviet Military – Political Activities,” dated 18 May 1984 and declassified in 2010, provides insights into the Soviet reactions to Able Archer 83. You can read / download this redacted document at the following link:

http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/17/19840518.pdf

A much more readable overview is available in the 21 May 2013 article entitled, “The Able Archer 83 War Scare: ‘NATO requested initial limited use of nuclear weapons,’” by Nate Jones, in which he states that:

“According to a declassified National Security Agency history…. the ‘period 1982-1984 marked the most dangerous Soviet-American confrontation since the Cuban Missile Crisis.’ The secret history recounts that ‘Cold War hysteria reached its peak’ in the autumn of 1983 with a NATO nuclear-release exercise named Able Archer 83, which…. caused ‘Soviet air units in Germany and Poland [to assume] high alert status with readying of nuclear strike forces.’”

You can read the complete article posted on The National Security Archives website at the following link:

https://nsarchive.wordpress.com/2013/05/21/war-scare-the-real-life-war-game-that-almost-led-to-nuclear-armageddon/

On 24 October 2015, David E. Hoffman, writing for The Washington Post, reported that:

“A nuclear weapons command exercise by NATO in November 1983 prompted fear in the leadership of the Soviet Union that the maneuvers were a cover for a nuclear surprise attack by the United States, triggering a series of unparalleled Soviet military responses…”

The Kremlin, uncertain about U.S. intentions, ordered a series of military measures that appeared to be actual preparations for war. A recently declassified 1990 assessment entitled, “The Soviet ‘War Scare,’” by the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board concluded:

“In 1983, we may have inadvertently placed our relations with the Soviet Union on a hair trigger…”

The Washington Post obtained a copy of this formerly highly classified (Top Secret – Cover Word – Code Word) assessment, which you can read / download (with modest redactions) at the following link:

http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/documents/world/read-the-us-assessment-that-concluded-the-soviet-leadership-feared-an-american-nuclear-strike-in-1983/1779/

Obviously, we all survived the War Scare of 1983. Maybe it was better for the public not to know. The Doomsday Clock was adjusted in January 1984 to three minutes before midnight, but not because of Able Archer 83. You can read the rationale for the clock setting on the editorial page in the January 1984 edition of The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, which you will find at the following link:

https://books.google.ca/books?id=zAUAAAAAMBAJ&pg=PA2&source=gbs_toc_r&cad=2#v=onepage&q&f=false

If the Science and Security Board had known the details that have surfaced in the past several years about Able Archer 83, I suspect the clock might have been a tick or two closer to midnight for a brief time.

The Doomsday Clock currently is set at three minutes to midnight.

Relax, the Planetary Defense Officer has the Watch

Peter Lobner

On 7 January 2016, NASA formalized its ongoing program for detecting and tracking Near-Earth Objects (NEOs) by establishing the Planetary Defense Coordination Office (PDCO). You can read the NASA announcement at the following link:

https://www.nasa.gov/feature/nasa-office-to-coordinate-asteroid-detection-hazard-mitigation

PDCO is responsible for supervision of all NASA-funded projects to find and characterize asteroids and comets that pass near Earth’s orbit around the sun. PDCO also will take a leading role in coordinating interagency and intergovernmental efforts in response to any potential impact threats. Specific assigned responsibilities are:

  • Ensuring the early detection of potentially hazardous objects (PHOs), which are defined as asteroids and comets whose orbits are predicted to bring them within 0.05 Astronomical Units (AUs) of Earth (7.48 million km, 4.65 million miles); and of a size large enough to reach Earth’s surface – that is, greater than 30 to 50 meters (98.4 to 164.0 feet);
  • Tracking and characterizing PHOs and issuing warnings about potential impacts;
  • Providing timely and accurate communications about PHOs; and
  • Performing as a lead coordination node in U.S. Government planning for response to an actual impact threat.

As you can see in the following organization chart, PDCO is part of NASA’s Planetary Science Division, in the agency’s Science Mission Directorate in Washington D.C.  PDCO is led by Lindley Johnson, longtime NEO program executive, who now has the very impressive title of “Planetary Defense Officer”.

Planetary Defense Coordination OfficeSource: NASA PDCO

You can find out more at the PDCO website at the following link:

https://www.nasa.gov/planetarydefense

The PDCO includes the Near Earth Object (NEO) Observation Program, which was established in 1998 in response to a request from the House Committee on Science that NASA find at least 90% of 1 km (0.62 mile) and larger NEOs. That goal was achieved by end of 2010.

The NASA Authorization Act of 2005 increased the scope of NEO objectives by amending the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 (“NASA Charter”) by adding the following new functional requirement:

 ‘‘The Congress declares that the general welfare and security of the United States require that the unique competence of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration be directed to detecting, tracking, cataloging, and characterizing near-Earth asteroids and comets in order to provide warning and mitigation of the potential hazard of such near-Earth objects to the Earth.’’

 This was further clarified by stating that NASA will:

“…plan, develop, and implement a Near-Earth Object Survey program to detect, track, catalogue, and characterize the physical characteristics of near-Earth objects equal to or greater than 140 meters (459 feet) in diameter in order to assess the threat of such near-Earth objects to the Earth. It shall be the goal of the Survey program to achieve 90 percent completion of its near-Earth object catalog within fifteen years (by 2020)”

The contractors supporting the NASA NEO Observation Program are Jet propulsion Laboratory (JPL), Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) / Lincoln laboratory, Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory, University Space Research Association, University of Arizona, and University of Hawaii / Institute of Astronomy.

Once detected, NEO orbits are precisely predicted and monitored by the Center for NEO Studies (CNEOS) at JPL. Their website is at the following link:

http://neo.jpl.nasa.gov/neo/

The catalog of known NEOs as of 3 November 2015 included 13,206 objects. NASA reports that new NEOs are being identified at a rate of about 1,500 per year. Roughly half of the known NEOs – about 6,800 – are objects larger than 140 meters (459 feet) in diameter. The estimated population of NEOs of this size is about 25,000. Current surveys are finding NEOs of this size at a rate of about 500 per year.  Recent encounters with NEOs include:

  • Asteroid 2015 TB145, the “Halloween Pumpkin”
    • Roughly spherical, about 610 meters (2,000 feet) in diameter
    • Detected 10 October 2015, approaching from the outer solar system, 21 days before closest approach
    • Closest approach occurred on 31 October 2015 at a distance of 310,000 miles (1.3 times the distance to the Moon) at a speed of about 78,000 miles an hour.
  • Asteroid airburst near Chelyabinsk, Russia
    • Airburst occurred 15 February 2013
    • Object estimated to be about 19 meters in diameter
    • Approached from the inner solar system; not detected before airburst
    • Peter Brown at the University of Western Ontario, estimated the energy of the Chelyabinsk airbust at 400 to 600 kilotons of TNT.  You can read this analysis in at the following link:

http://www.nature.com/articles/nature12741.epdf?referrer_access_token=OvLha95ujqCh0k4maNPuFNRgN0jAjWel9jnR3ZoTv0PyqszVJsMboh07BaZDfmONEget5lbJtDTXTwE2VvrDWIEgk5iXkd1EFvngsntJFeC1wOg4ASyku1lPPrkWlAPvoRMkxnjovQe0UYqFmFkZ6v9qqq9DL9_3CwYPmTWA6e-sweRQPIyrDHMUaAQYWA9H4TNSsZGN662UcGxlW5d1GA%3D%3D&tracking_referrer=www.theguardian.com

Another result of the NEO Observation Program is the following map of data gathered from 1994-2013 on small asteroids impacting Earth’s atmosphere and disintegrating to create very bright meteors, technically called “bolides” and commonly referred to as “fireballs”.  Sizes of orange dots (daytime impacts) and blue dots (nighttime impacts) are proportional to the optical radiated energy of impacts measured in billions of Joules (GJ) of energy, and show the location of impacts from objects about 1 meter (3 feet) to almost 20 meters (60 feet) in size.  You can see a rather uniform distribution of these fireballs over the surface of the Earth.

bolide_events_1994-2013 Source: NASA NEO Observation Program

In September 2014, the NASA Inspector General published the report, “NASA’s Efforts to Identify Near-Earth Objects and Mitigate Hazards,” which you can download for free at the following link:

https://oig.nasa.gov/audits/reports/FY14/IG-14-030.pdf

Key findings were the following:

  • Even though the Program has discovered, categorized, and plotted the orbits of more than 11,000 NEOs since 1998, NASA will fall short of meeting the 2005 Authorization Act goal of finding 90 percent of NEOs larger than 140 meters (459 feet) in diameter by 2020.
  • ….we believe the Program would be more efficient, effective, and transparent were it organized and managed in accordance with standard NASA research program requirements

You will find an NEO Program update, including a reference to the new Planetary Defense Coordination Office, presented by Lindley Johnson on 8 November 2915 at the following link:

http://www.minorplanetcenter.net/IAWN/2015_national_harbor/NEO_Program_update.pdf

So, what will we see in the years ahead as technology is explored and techniques are developed to defend Earth against a significant NEO impact? There have been many movies that have tried to answer that question, but none offered a particularly good answer.

Asteroid movies 2Asteroid movies 1 Source: Google

In 1968, Star Trek explored this issue in Season 3, Episode 3, “The Paradise Syndrome”. Ancient aliens had left a planetary defense device to protect a primitive civilization against their equivalent of NEOs. Only the intervention of Capt. James T. Kirk restored the device to operation in time to deflect an incoming asteroid and save the indigenous civilization.

Star Trek - The Paradise Syndrome 1 Source: memory-alpha.wiki.comStar Trek - The Paradise Syndrome 2 Source: technovelgy.com

Our new Planetary Defense Officer has a comparable responsibility on Earth, but without the benefits of special effects.

In 2010, National Academies Press published, “Defending Planet Earth: Near-Earth Object Surveys and Hazard Mitigation Strategies.” This report explores civil defense mitigation action and three basic defense techniques:

  • Slow push-pull methods
  • Kinetic impact methods
  • Nuclear methods

If you have a MyNAP account, you can download this report for free at the following link:

http://www.nap.edu/catalog/12842/defending-planet-earth-near-earth-object-surveys-and-hazard-mitigation

NAP Defending Planet Earth Source: NAP

Heritage Foundation’s 2016 Index of U.S. Military Strength

Peter Lobner

Heritage Foundation recently released the subject report, which assesses the current ability of the U.S. military to provide for the common defense. Heritage Foundation notes: “This …. Index of U.S. Military Strength gauges the ability of the U.S. military to perform its missions in today’s world, and each sub­sequent edition will provide the basis for measuring the improvement or weakening of that ability.”

Heritage Foundation 2016 index cover  Source: Heritage Foundation

The report, edited by Dakota L. Wood, is organized as follows:

  • Introduction.
  • Executive Summary
  • The Role of a Strong National Defense
  • The Contemporary Spectrum of Conflict: Protracted, Gray Zone, Ambiguous, and Hybrid Modes of War
  • Preempting Further Russian Aggression Against Europe
  • Intelligence and National Defense
  • America’s Reserve and National Guard Components: Key Contributors to U.S. Military Strength
  • Assessing the Global Operating Environment
  • Assessing Threats to U.S. Vital Interests
  • An Assessment of U.S. Military Power
  • Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations
  • Methodology
  • Appendix: Military Capabilities and Corresponding Modernization Programs

The Heritage Foundation notes that the, “2016 Index of U.S. Mil­itary Strength concludes that America’s ‘hard power’ has deteriorated still further over the past year, pri­marily as a result of inadequate funding that has led to a shrinking force that possesses aging equipment and modest levels of readiness for combat.”

You can download the complete report, or just individual sections or chapters, at the following link:

http://index.heritage.org/military/2016/resources/download/

I hope you will read this report and draw your own conclusions.

The Sad State of Affairs of the U.S. Icebreaking Fleet and Implications for Future U.S. Arctic Operations

Peter Lobner

On 1 Sep 2015, while visiting Alaska, President Obama announced that he would speed up the acquisition of icebreakers to help the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) operate in the Arctic. A Congressional Research Service report entitled, Coast Guard Polar Icebreaker Modernization: Background and Issues for Congress, was issued on 2 Sep 2015.  You can download this report at the following link:

https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL34391.pdf

This report asserts that a new heavy polar icebreaker will cost in the range from $900 million to $1.1 billion.  The report also provides an interesting history of prior USCG assessments  of their icebreaker needs and  budget actions taken over the past few years that significantly reduced the budget available to pursue new icebreaker acquisition.

Role of the National Science Foundation

In 2006, the G.W. Bush administration moved budget and management authority for the U.S. polar icebreaker fleet from the USCG to the National Science Foundation (NSF). The USCG retained custody of the polar icebreakers, which continue to be operated by USCG crews. This arrangement is recorded in the following 2006 document: Memorandum of Agreement Between United States Coast Guard and National Science Foundation Regarding Polar Icebreaking Support and Reimbursement. You can read the details of this convoluted agreement at the following link:

https://www.nsf.gov/geo/plr/opp_advisory/briefings/oct2005/2005_uscgnsf_moa.pdf

The current U.S. polar icebreaker fleet

Currently the entire U.S. national capability for Arctic and Antarctic icebreaking operations is found in a very small icebreaking fleet consisting of:

  • One heavy polar icebreaker, Coast Guard Cutter Polar Star
    • Commissioned in 1976
    • Displacement: 13,194 tons
    • Horsepower: 75,000 hp (gas turbines) + 18,000 hp (diesels)
  • One medium polar icebreaker, Coast Guard Cutter Healy
    • Commissioned in 1999
    • Displacement: 16,000 tons
    • Horsepower: 30,000 (diesels)
  • Some ice-capable tugs and tenders

In addition to this active “fleet”, the U.S. also has an inactive heavy polar icebreaker; the  Polar Sea (sister ship of Polar Star), which was commissioned in 1978 and placed in inactive commission in Seattle, WA in 2010 after a major propulsion plant equipment casualty. A 2013 USCG analysis, required by Congress to forestall the planned scrapping of the Polar Sea, showed that Polar Sea could be rehabilitated and reactivated for a fraction of the cost of building a new icebreaker. Polar Sea remains in inactive commission.

Polar Star_Polar SeaSource: Wikipedia

Polar Star & Polar Sea together in happier days.

In 2006, NSF put Polar Star in caretaker status due to equipment aging / wear-out issues. The ship originally was designed for a 30 year operating life.  After a modest refurbishment, the ship returned to Antarctic service in late 2013. Polar Star is expected to continue operating until about 2020.

After Polar Sea suffered its major propulsion system casualty in 2010, and until the Polar Star returned to service in late 2013, the medium icebreaker Healy was the only active U.S. polar icebreaker.

In February 2015, the USCG reported that it needed three heavy and three medium icebreakers to cover the U.S. “anticipated needs” in the Arctic and Antarctic. Six different U.S. agencies have missions in Polar regions.

U.S. Coast Guard’s 2013 Review of Major Icebreakers of the World is a chart that provides a good visual representation of the world’s icebreaker fleets. This chart is reproduced below, but you may need to go to the following link to see a more readable and downloadable pdf version of this  chart:

https://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg552/docs/20130718%20Major%20Icebreaker%20Chart.pdf

Icebreakers

The icons in this chart for the U.S. icebreaker fleet include the Polar Star, Polar Sea (inactive) and Healy, as expected. The other two vessels are:

  • Nathaniel B. Palmer, a privately owned, ice capable research ship leased by NSF to support Antarctic science missions.
  • Aiviq, a privately owned icebreaking, anchor-handling tug supply vessel chartered by Royal Dutch Shell to support their oil exploration activities in the Chukchi Sea off Alaska.

So, really, the U.S. currently only has two polar icebreakers. One typically serves the Antarctic and one serves the Arctic.  In 2013, the USCG got approval too explore developing a new heavy-duty icebreaker.  In mid-2015, the USCG website reports:

“The Coast Guard is in the preliminary phase of a new, heavy polar icebreaker acquisition program. This stage in the process includes developing a formal mission need statement, a concept of operations, and an operational requirements document – all necessary before developing and implementing a detailed acquisition plan.”

Russia’s polar icebreaker fleet

In comparison, the USCG’s 2013 chart shows that Russia fields almost 40 icebreakers with up to a dozen more planned or under construction. Russia has national plans to exploit its Arctic resources along the Northern Sea Route, which passes through the Arctic Ocean along the north coast of Russia. Nuclear-powered icebreakers play important roles in those plans.

The first of the new LK-60 nuclear-powered heavy polar icebreakers, Arktika, is under construction in St. Petersburg’s Baltic Shipyard and is expected to enter service in 2017. Its icebreaking bow was installed in August 2015.

LK-60_Arktika-bow_Aug2015 Source: http://bellona.org/

Contracts for two additional LK-60-class icebreakers were placed in May 2014. They are scheduled for delivery in 2019 and 2020.

U.S. Navy Arctic Roadmap 2014 – 2030

The recently published U.S. Navy Arctic Roadmap 2014 – 2030 includes the following observations:

  • U.S. Navy expects the Arctic “to remain a low threat security environment where nations resolve differences peacefully.”
  • It sees its role as mostly a supporter of U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) operations and responder to search-and-rescue and disaster situations.
  • However, the presence of vast resource endowments and territorial disagreements “contributes to a possibility of localized episodes of friction in the Arctic Region, despite the peaceful intentions of the Arctic nations.”
  • “Navy functions in the Arctic Region are not different from those in other maritime regions; however, the Arctic Region environment makes the execution of many of these functions much more challenging.”

Regarding the first and third points, above, Russian activities in the Arctic during the past year suggest that the U.S. Navy has underestimated, at least publically, the likelihood of non-peaceful actions in the Arctic and the potential need for a military response in the region. Recent Russian activities in the Arctic highlight this risk.

Given the poor state of the U.S. polar icebreaker fleet, I would say that the last point, above, is a gross understatement. The USCG and the Navy are not well-positioned for surface operations in the Arctic Ocean. Surface naval operations in ice-covered Arctic regions will be almost impossible to execute without a capable U.S. icebreaker fleet.

You can download a copy of the Navy’s Arctic Roadmap at the following link:

http://www.navy.mil/docs/USN_arctic_roadmap.pdf

Examples of worrisome recent Russian activities in the Arctic are:

  • Since early 2014, Russia has been conducting bomber and fighter missions close to the airspace of its Arctic neighbors.  This kind of military behavior has not been seen since the Cold War ended in the early 1990s.
  • 1 December 2014: Russia’s new Arctic Joint Strategic Command became operational. This provides central management of all Russian military resources in the Arctic, and there are a lot of them. The new command, based on the Northern Fleet and headquartered at Severomorsk, will acquire military, naval surface and strategic nuclear subsurface, air force and aerospace defense units, assets, and bases transferred from other Russian Military Districts
  • 15 – 20 March 2015: Russia conducted a massive, five-day military exercise in the Arctic involving about 80,000 troops, 220 aircraft, 41 ships, and 15 submarines. This exercise was conducted on the one-year anniversary of the Russian annexation of Crimea.
  • 4 August 2015: Russia’s Foreign Ministry confirmed that Russia had re-submitted to the United Nations it’s Arctic extended continental shelf claim. Russia is seeking recognition for its formal economic control of 1.2 million square kilometers (463,320 square miles) of Artic sea shelf extending more than 350 nautical miles from the shore.

The new U.S. Arctic Executive Steering Committee

In contrast to  Russia’s new Arctic Joint Strategic Command, President Obama issued an Executive Order in 15 January 2015 setting up the Arctic Executive Steering Committee, which will be responsible for enhancing coordination of national efforts in the Arctic.  How this new Steering Committee will affect progress on revitalizing the U.S. polar icebreaker fleet remains to be seen. You can read the full text of this Executive Order at the following link:

https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/01/21/executive-order-enhancing-coordination-national-efforts-arctic

The bottom line

The U.S. is well behind the power curve for conducting operations in the Arctic that require icebreaker support.  Even with a well-funded new U.S. icebreaker construction program, it will take a decade before the first new ship is ready for service, and by that time, the new ship will be entering the fleet just as the  Polar Star is retiring or entering a comprehensive life-extension refurbishment program.

If you find yourself icebound in the Arctic anytime in the next decade, I think your best bet is to call the Canadians or the Russians for help.

5 February 2016 update:

In mid-January 2016, former Coast Guard Commandant Adm. Bob Papp made the following points at the annual Surface Navy Association meeting near Washington D.C.:

  • The U.S. will need eight icebreakers if it decides to have one patrolling in each polar region at all times.  The Coast Guard has never been able to support that high an operational tempo.
  • U.S. Arctic policy is a matter of national security; not just a matter of defense. The State Department’s vision focuses as well on sovereign rights and responsibilities of Arctic nations, maritime safety, energy, economic interests, environmental stewardship, scientific research and support to indigenous peoples.
  • More icebreakers are essential, because the U.S. can’t support its policies without being physically able to move about in the polar regions.

Read more details at the following link:

http://www.navytimes.com/story/military/2016/01/15/coast-guard-needs-8-icebreakers-cover-polar-regions-retired-4-star/78749864/

The current Coast Guard Commandant, Adm. Paul Zukunft, has stated that the schedule for the new icebreaker procurement program calls for a contract award for one icebreaker by fall 2019, with production beginning in 2020. Initial operational capability for this first new icebreaker would not be until the mid-2020s.  A Federal Business Opportunity (FBO) notice for the USCG Polar Icebreaker Replacement Program was posted online on 13 January 2016.  You can read the FBO notice and download the industry data package at the following link:

https://www.fbo.gov/index?s=opportunity&mode=form&id=68bf40747603b6acecc73e5ccc2974b6&tab=core&_cview=1

Well, this is a start.  When the new icebreaker enters the Coast Guard fleet and Polar Star retires after about 50 years of operation, the U.S. still will have only two polar icebreakers.